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I. Introduction
Following the end of the Cold War, countries on every
continent moved to market-driven economies--selling state-
owned enterprises and structuring economic regimes to encourage
private-sector investment and market competition. Many
countries broke up vertically integrated monopolies in an effort to
spur price reductions through competition.' In addition, many
nations privatized state-owned enterprises in the hopes of infusing
new management skills into these staid ventures.2 This dynamic is
at work in the world's electrical energy sector.3
Steadily increasing demand for electric energy has created
requirements for new capital investments that exceed the ability of
governments to provide. Consequently, nations have opened up
their energy sectors in order to tap new capital sources, even when
they have left their state-owned enterprises intact.
4
Not since 1910, when Samuel Insull first advocated the electric
utility monopoly,5 has there been such a worldwide move toward
the complete transformation of the electrical energy industry.6 In
the midst of this dramatic transformation, several electricity
system models have emerged. None of these new electricity
system models have reached a level of acceptance so as to replace
Insull's electric utility monopoly model.7 One model, however,
I See David L. Moore & Diana M. DePinto, Solving the Capital Crises: Energy
Sector Restructuring, Commercialization and Privatization, LATINFINANCE 19 (Supp.
June 1994) (discussing project finance in Latin America).
2 See id.
3 See id.
' See id.
5 See Ralph Cavanagh, Responsible Power Marketing in an Increasingly
Competitive Era, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 331, 333-34 (1988) [hereinafter Cavanagh,
Responsible Power] (citing Samuel Insull, Sell Your Product at a Price Which Will
Enable You to Get a Monopoly, Address (Jan. 6, 1910), in CENTRAL STATION ELECTRIC
SOURCE 116-17 (1915)).
6 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19.
7 The sweeping reforms in Latin America have not been universal. Indeed, this is
not a monolithic world, and in its 193 nation states and 57 overseas territories and
dependencies there are countless combinations and permutations of electricity systems.
See, e.g., MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINING AND PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRY, DOCUMENT
INDICATING THE OUTLOOK FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM (1994) (describing an
alternative model in place in Mexico).
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has emerged as the most likely to supersede the electric utility
monopoly model as the world standard---the "fully unbundled,
competitive electricity market" model.'
The fully unbundled, competitive electricity market model was
first advocated in the 1980s by Professor Stephen Littlechild of the
United Kingdom9 and by Sebastion Bernstein, then a member of
the National Energy Commission of Chile."0 In 1988, the
Conservative government of the United Kingdom, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, adopted the
"Littlechild Model."" In the aftermath of its adoption by the
government of the United Kingdom, similar legislation
implementing variations of this model has been enacted in Chile,"2
Peru, 3 Bolivia, 14 and Argentina 5 in South America-known as the
8 For an explanation of the fully unbundled, competitive electricity market model,
see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
9 See Stephen Littlechild, Spot Pricing of Electricity: Arguments and Prospects,
ENERGY POLICY, Aug. 1988. Kyle Pope, Utility Privatizations Backfire in the UK.,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at A10. Stephen Littlechild, an academic when he proposed
the model, currently serves as head of the United' Kingdom's Office of Electricity
Regulation. See generally id. (noting that Littlechild "dreamed up the industry's
incentive-based rate scheme nearly a decade ago").
10 See Sebastion Bernstein, Competition, Marginal Cost Tariffs and Spot Pricing
in the Chilean Electric Power Sector, ENERGY POLICY, Aug. 1988, at 369.
11 See Tim Woolf, Retail Competition in the Electricity Industry: Lessons from the
United Kingdom, ELECTRICITY J. 56, 57 (1994) (analyzing the impact of electricity
industry reform in the United Kingdom).
12 See CHILE FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, ENERGY INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES 10-11 (1995) (discussing the legal framework that guarantees "the rights
of private ownership" of energy enterprises); see also Saud Siddique, Financing Private
Power in Latin America and the Carribean, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1995, at 18, 19 ("Chile's
privatization program during the early 1980s involved the reorganization of the state
power utilities and the sale of their assets to private investors to form a system of
competing generation and distribution companies, with concomitant changes in pricing
and management policies."). The first country that deregulated the power sector on the
basis of unbundling their activities and creating a competitive market was Chile, which
initiated its reforms in 1980. Privatization of all government-owned facilities was done
in the period of 1982 to 1996.
13 See Peru, INT'L PRIVATE POWER QUARTERLY, Second Quarter 1995, at 186, 188-
89 [hereinafter Peru, Second Quarter 1995] (noting that, in November 1992, Peru
removed most of the barriers to private ownership and operation of generation,
transmission, and distribution facilities).
14 See Ley de Electricidad (Law of Electricity) No. 1604 (Dec. 21, 1994) (Bol); see
also Bolivia, INT'L PRIVATE POWER QUARTERLY, Second Quarter 1995, at 24, 26
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"Southern Cone Model" 16-- and in Guatemala 17  in Central
America. In addition, the model has been promoted, in concept, in
the United States not only by academics, but also by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and the California Public Utilities
Commission. Moreover, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela are considering introducing new electric power
laws'that will likely reflect this model. 9
Central and South American countries are among the vanguard
of nations reforming their electrical energy industry by adopting
the Littlechild model. These same Central and South American
[hereinafter Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995] (discussing the legislation, adopted in
December 1994, that allowed privatization of the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad).
15 See FELIX HELOU & MARTIN RODRIQUEZ PARDINA, TRANSFORMATION OF THE
ELECTRICAL SECTOR §§ 1-3 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing the
implementation of Ley Numero 24065 adopted in December 1991). Argentina's power
sector reform was initiated in 1989 and privatization was completed between 1991 and
1994.
16 See Peter Lalor & Hernan Garcia, Reshaping Power Markets: Lessons from
South America, ELECTRICITY J. (Mar. 1996).
1I See Ley General de Electricidad (General Law of. Electricity), Borrador § 5-C2-
24, Comision de Energia, Congreso de Republica (Oct. 1996) (Guatemala); Energy
Commission Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, Draft Law 5-62-24. See generally
A. John Armstrong, Legal and Institutional Issues Relating to Private Investment in the
Guatemalan Energy Sector 4-11 (Oct. 1, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) (reviewing the laws of Guatemala that allow for private sector energy production
(citing GUAT. CONST. § X, ART. 129)); MERIDIAN CORP., Focus ON GUATEMALA: A
GEOTHERMAL INTERNATIONAL SERIES (1987) (discussing Guatemala's commitment to the
free enterprise system and to the private sector).
IS See Ralph Cavanagh, The Future of America's Electric Utilities: Reconciling
Deregulation and Least-Cost Planning, ELECTRICITY J., May 1991, at 20, 20-22
[hereinafter. Cavanagh, Future] (discussing changes in electric utilities); see also News
Release, CPUC Offers Electrical Restructuring Proposals for Comment, California
Public Utilities Commission (1995) (describing the restructuring suggestions that were
proposed on May 24, 1995). The movement towards reform of the electricity industry
in the United States is beginning to spread. See John Greenwald, Power to the People,
TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 53, 53-54 (discussing the movement towards unbundling and
deregulating the electricity industry in the United States).
19 See Siddique, supra note 12, at 18, 19 (listing other Latin American nations that
are considering adopting new electricity laws); see also Michael T. Burr, Success in
South America, INDEP. ENERGY, May-June 1994, at 18, 18-23 [hereinafter Burr, Success]
(discussing power development in Latin America). See generally Lisa Sedelnik, Power
Surge: Countries and Companies Connect to Electrify the Region, LATINFINANCE, Oct.
1994, at 89, 89-91 (reviewing the electricity industry in Latin America).
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nations represent a significant emerging market for the renewable
energy industry; thus, there is a real and present necessity for the
renewable energy industry to understand the implications of the
enactment and institutionalization of the Littlechild model in Latin
America and to develop a strategic approach for this market.
These implications will have the most immediate and direct effect
on that sector of the renewable energy industry that incorporates
base-load or dispatchable power sources, such as geothermal,
hydropower, bioenergy, and wind energy.2" Unless new and
innovative legal and financing approaches are developed, the
implementation of the Littlechild model in Latin America may
cause a major setback to the renewable energy industry's
movement into new international markets.2 The Littlechild model
has stimulated and will continue to stimulate significant changes
in the worldwide electrical energy industry.22
In order to evaluate the potential impact of the Littlechild and
Southern Cone models on the renewable energy industry, one must
understand the fundamental difference between the economies of
the models and the economics of the renewable industry. The
models mandate a focus on short-term prices and the renewable
industry is dependent on long-term pricing.
For renewables, the bulk of a project's total lifetime cost is
represented by the initial capital cost, and will be incurred before
the project ever comes on line. The cost of a renewable energy is
20 See Agis Salpukas, 70's Dreams, 90's Realities, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1995, at
D8 (discussing the decline in popularity of renewables in the wake of widespread sector
reforms). See id. at D9 (reviewing the various costs to produce different forms of
renewable energy).
21 See generally Francisco J. Gutierrez, A Region in Transition, INDEP. ENERGY,
Jan. 1995, at 33, 36-37 (discussing the need for environmental responsibility in the Latin
American electricity sectors).
22 See id. at 37 (discussing changes and possible changes in the energy sectors of
Latin American nations); see also Chronological Summary Environmental Events in
Latin America, 1995, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.L. & POL'Y 367, 368 (1995) [hereinafter
Chronological Summary] (discussing the CONCAUSA Declaration). In the
CONCAUSA Declaration, signed by the President of the United States and the leaders
of several Central American countries in December 1994, the countries of the region
committed themselves to "[e]stablish, as soon as possible, policy and regulatory reform
that will increase the participation of the private-sector in the electricity sub-sector, and
that will ensure reliable service and rational energy pricing."
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in the technology effort exerted at the outset of a project and all of
the renewable share "front-end-loaded" cost profiles.
Consequently, the majority of new generation facilities are funded
through project financing whereby the principal and interest (and
profit) is paid from the proceeds of the project. The power
purchase agreement rather than the credit-worthiness of the
developer collateralizes the loan. Since renewable energy projects
are front-end-loaded, the cost of capital significantly affects
installed cost.
Renewable energy costs are competitive with those of
conventional fuels if life-cycle costs are taken into consideration;
but the new models virtually eliminate life-cycle cost
considerations, threatening the viability of the renewable energy
industry.
This Article will consider the effect of the new world electric
power order on the renewable energy industry. Having posited
that the renewable energy industry is in the midst of a classic
paradigm shift, the Article will then consider whether such a shift
foreshadows serious problems for the renewable energy industry,
or merely signals a relatively benign change in circumstances. To
explore this question, the Article will examine the current use of
the Littlechild model by: (i) discussing the two electricity systems
that traditionally dominated the industry; 3 (ii) describing pressures
for reform of the status quo, including the need to generate private-
sector capital, to respect worldwide environmental concerns, and
to navigate the internal political and social mandates that confront
developing countries;24 and (iii) outlining the evolving reform
trends." The Article will then consider the implementation of the
Littlechild model in the United Kingdom and Peru.26 In addition,
it will briefly review the implementation of the Littlechild model
in Bolivia and Argentina. 7 Next, this Article will closely examine
the potential impact of the Littlechild model on the renewable
23 See infra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 71-102 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 103-247 and' accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 248-65 and accompanying text.
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energy community. 28 Finally, this Article will explore ways in
which the renewable energy community can mobilize a responsive
strategy and, in so doing, give direction to the countries that want
to develop indigenous energy.'9
II. Evolution to a New World Electricity Order
A. The Status Quo
The electric utility monopoly model is the predominant electric
power industry model Worldwide." Self-generation, however,
continues to be a supplementary model that has survived the
demise of the integrated utility in many of the developing
nations. 1
1. The Self-Generation Model
The self-generation model prevailed during the industrial
revolution.32 Under this model, electricity is produced for self-use;
for instance, each company produces the electricity that it needs to
operate.33 As industries multiplied in the early part of the
twentieth century, economic efficiency dictated a move away from
the self-generation model.34
28 See infra notes 266-91 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 292-313 and accompanying text.
30 See Cavanagh, Responsible Power, supra note 5, at 333-34.
31 See id. at 332.
32 See generally id. (discussing the history of the electric utility industry).
33 See id
31 See generally id. (discussing the history of the electric utility industry). In 1910,
Samual Insull stated:
If you [electric utilities] will bring your price down to a point where you can
compel the manufacturer to shut down his private plant because he will save
money by doing so; if you can compel the street railway to shut down its
generating plant; if you can compel the city waterworks, whether privately or
publicly owned, to shut down its power plant because of the price you quote-
then you will begin to realize the possibilities of this business, and these
possibilities may exceed your wildest dreams.
Id. (alteration in original) (statement of Samuel Insull) (quoting Samuel Insull, Sell Your
Product at a Price Which Will Enable You to Get a Monopoly, Address (Jan. 6, 1910),
in CENT. STATION ELECTRIC SERVICE 116-17 (1915)).
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Despite its decline, the self-generation model continues to
supplement the electric utility monopoly model in developing
countries like India and Peru. In India, for example, the delivery
of electric power by utilities is unreliable; thus, for industrial
survival, manufacturing facilities that require reliable electricity
twenty-four hours a day generate their own electricity.35 In Peru,
the transmission systems do not reach some of the isolated mining
areas of the country; thus, self-generation of electricity by the
mining companies is required.36
2. The Electric Utility Monopoly Model
Throughout the twentieth century, the organization of the
electric power industry has been heavily influenced by "[n]atural
monopoly considerations."37 The organization of the industry has
been characterized by the integration of both the generation and
the distribution of power. This integration of generation and
distribution brings economies of scale into both producing and
distributing power.39
As competition increased during this century, some companies
responded by focusing on base-load capacity, which uses
generators with relatively low operating costs, such as coal
plants. 40 By operating these types of plants at maximum capacity,
an electric company is able to spread a plant's high fixed costs
over many sales hours, thereby reducing rates.4' As predicted by
Samuel Insull,42 the father of the electric utility monopoly model,
these economies reduced electrical rates enough to remove the
attractiveness of self-generation.43
35 See Bodhisatva Ganguli, A Private Power Plan, INDEP. ENERGY, Jan. 1995, at 18
(discussing the methods by which electricity is produced in India).
36 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 188 (noting that 1400
megawatts of electricity are self-generated by private industrial companies).
37 Cavanagh, Responsible Power, supra note 5, at 334.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 332 n.4.
41 See id.
42 See supra text accompanying note 2.
43 See Cavanagh, Responsible Power, supra note 5, at 332.
1997] 457
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The electric utility monopoly model is characterized by a move
from self-generation to government participation." At one end of
the spectrum, total government ownership and control of the utility
characterize government participation. For instance, the
governments of Kenya,46 Indonesia, and Honduras own and control
their respective utility industries. At the other end of the spectrum,
the operation of the generation, transmission, and distribution
facilities are controlled by the private sector, as is the case in
Chile, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.47 In between these two
extremes, one finds nations, like the United Kingdom, in which
the electricity industry is privately owned and government-
controlled.48  In most of the developed nations, like the United
States, 9 and increasingly in the developing countries, like the
Philippines," the electrical energy sector is characterized by a mix
of government-owned, government-regulated, and privately owned
systems. Generally, if a nation's utilities are privately owned, then
the government grants exclusivity rights and guarantees asset-
based rates of return. 51
44 See id. (discussing the history of the electric utility industry).
45 See generally Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 21 (discussing the types of
electricity monopolies that have existed and continue to exist around the world).
46 See generally INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 7
(1989) (noting that all electricity in Kenya is supplied by Kenya Power and Lighting
Company Ltd. and its affiliates).
47 See Roger D. Feldman, Power and Infrastructure Privatization in Mexico,
TRANSACTIONAL FINANCE (McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1993, at
6. See generally MINISTRY OF ENERGY, supra note 7 (describing the model in place in
Mexico).
48 See generally Woolf, supra note 11, at 57-60 (discussing the privatization of the
United Kingdom's electricity industry and noting that the government of the United
Kingdom "has been involved in nearly every aspect of the electricity industry").
'9 See generally Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 21 (describing the electricity
industry in the United States).
10 See generally Dennis P. Pedron, Private Power Program in the Philippines 1-2
(Sept. 21, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing the electricity
industry in the Philippines).
51 See generally Cavanagh, Responsible Power, supra note 5, at 333-53
(describing marketing in the electricity industries of many nations).
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B. Pressures on Electric Utility Monopolies That Motivate
Reform
1. The Need for New Sources of Capital for New Power
Projects
Despite the relative success of the electric utility monopoly
model, the need for capital for new power projects served as a
catalyst for change. 2 One major change occurred when nations
began opening their electrical energy markets to private
investment, which, in turn, made the industry more effective and
cost competitive. 3 In developing countries, the majority of the
state-owned utilities traditionally funded new power projects in
three ways: (i) governmental appropriation, (ii) bilateral aid tied
to equipment purchases, and (iii) World Bank funding.14 Over the
last decade, these systems of funding began to break down." In
particular, the funding dissipated because many governments
experienced cash flow problems, many countries stopped offering
bilateral aid, and the World Bank loans became more difficult to
obtain due to the attachment of more demanding conditions to the
loans. 6 At the same time, the worldwide demand for electrical
energy created requirements for capital investment at a time when
52 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19-20; see also Terry Newendorp,
Financing the 90s 2 (Sept. 22, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(noting that the "shortage of public sector capital is one of the driving factors in the
world's push toward privatization of many of the. industrial and utility sectors that were
previously controlled by governments"); Siddique, supra note 12, at 20-21 (discussing
the need for capital to build new power projects in order to satisfy Latin America's
electric power needs).
53 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 22.
54 See Ganguli, supra note 35, at 18 (discussing the financing methods used by the
Indian government). See generally Siddique, supra note 12, at 20-21 (reviewing
financing methods in Latin America).
11 See Ganguli, supra note 35, at 18.
56 See id. (discussing the problems that arose in implementing India's method of
financing new energy projects); see also Sridhar Samudrala, Opportunity Emerges,
INDEP. ENERGY, Jan. 1995, at 26 (discussing the difficulties faced by Indian energy
companies in obtaining resources for projects); Michael T. Burr, Survival of the
Strategist, INDEP. ENERGY, Oct. 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Burr, Survival] (noting
worldwide capacity projections of 884 gigawatts of new capacity added by utilities and
independent power producers through 2003).
1997] 459
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state-owned utilities were unable to provide it." Experts generally
acknowledge that the electricity industry generates sufficient
revenue to be self-sustaining. Indeed, realizing that the electric
power industry is among the highest grossing industries in the
world," what caused the capital shortfall in the state-owned utility
sector that created the current crisis?
This relationship becomes clear when one examines countries
in which the electrical energy sectors were operated as instruments
of government." In those nations, funds generated by the
electrical energy sector have been diverted into non-energy related
social and political programs." The energy sector, in general, and
the electricity sector, in particular, have been historically a revenue
source by which social policies, such as employment programs
and subsidies to low-income customers, were financed.6 ' This
diversion of funds from the energy sector has resulted in a lack of
available capital for needed investment in state-owned electricity
systems.62 In turn, the need for increased capitalization of state-
owned electricity systems has placed, and is continuing to place
significant pressure on many nations operating under the electric
utility monopoly model.
51 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19.
11 The business of generating and distributing electricity engenders annual
revenues estimated at more than $800 billion--twice the size of the world's automobile
industry. See Christopher Flavin & Nicholas Lenssen, Powering the Future: Blueprint
for a Substantial Electricity Industry, WORLDWATCH PAPER, June 1994, at 19. Although
it may be debatable whether the electricity industry has been self-sustaining considering
its historical debt dependency, one may reasonably argue that growth through debt
rather than equity is a managerial choice that does not undermine the contention that a
government-owned utility, without taxes or shareholder dividends to pay, could well be
a self-sustaining industry. See id.
19 See generally Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19-20 (discussing the ways
that governments control the electricity sector).
60 See generally id. at 20-21 (noting that, in the past, the electricity sectors in many
countries were using their capital to puruse social and political goals).
61 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 20-21. German law supports the
purchase of German coal. Quebec law subsidizes hydro electric dams. French law
supports nuclear power. See Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 58, at 15.
62 See generally Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that a government
owned electric utility industry is not operated in an "economically efficient manner").
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2. The Need to Upgrade Existing Facilities
Although the creation of private capital sources for funding
new electricity sector capacity may be the overriding goal in the
worldwide restructuring of the government-owned utility sector,
there are a number of other significant problems with which both
public and private utilities are coping--the upgrade of existing
facilities to meet environmental imperatives, for example.63
International concerns about the environmental degradation
resulting from the burning of non-renewable fossil fuels and about
the concomitant effect on global warming, acid rain, and other air
pollution problems must be considered by electrical industry
strategists worldwide. In Latin America, the new environmental
policies adopted by lending and technical assistance institutions
dovetail into the economics of creating new environmental sources
of funding to cope with these imperatives.64 Even in countries in
which there is little current need for new generation capacity,
environmental concerns create pressures to make capital
expenditures to address these concerns. For example, although
demand for new power is relatively modest in the European
Union, international and domestic pressure to reduce emissions of
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulates compelled some
members of the European Union to clean up, re-power, and replace
their already installed bases.65
3. The Need to Infuse New Management
In addition, the traditional electric utility monopoly feels
pressure to change in order to realize an infusion of new
management skills into a stagnant industry.66  For instance,
throughout Latin America, an overhaul of the management of the
utility systems seems imperative in order to achieve adequate
service delivery.67  Generally, in nations operating under the
63 See generally Gutierrez, supra note 21, at 33-36 (discussing the increased desire
of Latin American nations to become environmentally responsible).
64 See id. at 21.
65 See Michael Burr, Harmonizing and Liberalizing, INDEP. ENERGY, April 1994, at
21-22 (discussing current trends in Europe's power industry).
66 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 20.
61 See Gutierrez, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing the need for improved
1997]
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electric utility monopoly model, it is perceived that the managers
of electric utilities are insulated from accountability for their
performance due to a growing bureaucracy and an ever-increasing
political intrusiveness in managerial decisions.
4. The Need to Eliminate Subsidies and Rationalize
Electricity Prices
Finally, debtor countries are under increasing pressure from
their multi-national lending institutions to bring tariffs into line
with costs in order to meet debt burdens and as a condition
precedent to obtaining new loans. Thus, countries such as
Guatemala instituted rate hikes in response to pressure from their
lending institutions. 69 After raising rates, these countries found
themselves in turmoil, with the governments' political survival in
jeopardy and the countries' continuing stability in question.7" In
essence, governments are reforming their electric utility industries
because of the pressure to find a way to create downward pressure
on costs and prices.
C. Evolving Trends in Electric Utility Monopoly Reform
There is not just one problem facing the world's electricity
industry; and there is not just one solution to each problem. In
fact, nations are either considering or implementing a wide variety
of solutions. A litany of all that is occurring around the world
would be extremely complex if described with accuracy, and
inaccurate if oversimplified. Nevertheless, some simplification is
necessary for the analytic purpose of this Article. With this caveat
in mind, at least four predominant trends can be identified:
(i) private sector investment of capital," (ii) infusion of new
management skills,72 (iii) maximization of competition, and (iv)
management in the power sector in Latin America).
68 See id.
69 See Lee M. Goodwin, Central America and the Carribean: No Place for the
Unwary, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 15, 1994, at 58.
70 See, e.g., id.; Lee M. Goodwin, Know Your Buyer, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1,
1994, at 37.
71 See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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purchase of new technologies.74
1. Private-Sector Investment of Capital
In one trend, governments are turning to the private-sector as a
capital source to create new generation capacity and to clean up,
re-power, and replace their existing facilities.
First, in order for a government to generate private-sector
capital, it must amend its laws to allow private-sector investors to
invest in and make a profit from the building of new generation,
transmission, and distribution facilities." This course of action
implies some degree of private-sector ownership and control, and
it suggests a concomitant relinquishment of existing government
ownership of the electric utilities.76 Other theoretical options, such
as the Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) concept, may be
compatible with private-sector investment in some government
monopolies, but they are not yet widespread in the electricity
sector, where turnkey projects are still preferred.77
Second, some private-sector investors prefer to invest in
cleaning up, re-powering, and replacing existing generation
facilities.78 For that reason, some governments restructure their
74 See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
15 See Anthony A. Churchill, Beyond Project Finance, ELECTRICITY J., June 2,
1995, at 23, 24-25.
76 See id. at 24.
77 See id. at 27-28 (discussing financing options and noting that some new options
are beginning to emerge for private companies wanting to invest in the electricity
sector). But see Pedron, supra note 50, at 1-2 (citing Republic Act No. 6957, An Act
Authorizing Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects (July
1990) (Phil.)). The Act Authorizing Construction, Operation and Maintenance of
Infrastructurre Projects was also known at the "BOT/BT [f]aw." See id. at 1. The
BOT/BT law and its implementing rules and regulations set forth the mechanics of the
implementation of both the Build, Own, Transfer (BOT) and the Build, Transfer (BT)
infrastructure projects. See id. at 2. The BOT projects in the Philippines include the
Hopewell Holdings Navotas Gas Turbines with 310 megawatts capacity and the Enron
Power Corporation's Pinamucan, Batangas Diesel Power Plant with 105 megawatts
capacity. See id. at 15. An example of the BTO model in the Philippines is the Liman,
Bataan Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Power Plant with a 210 megawatts capacity. See
id.
78 See Ganguli, supra note 35, at 21; see also Gutierrez, supra note 21, at 34
(discussing the need to improve and make more efficient the current power plants in
Latin America).
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legal regimes to allow the sale, in whole or in part, of existing
facilities to private-sector investors, thereby ensuring
capitalization. 9 These governments either rely exclusively on the
profit motive to ensure the desired upgrades or couple the sale
with the condition that revenue will be reinvested in specified up-
grades.8° In either event, the sale of such facilities ends long-
standing government monopolies.
2. Infusion of New Management Into Existing Facilities
In another trend, nations are attempting to infuse new and
better management skills into their electric utilities.8' Improving
management skills implies managerial autonomy and performance
accountability-in other words, control and ownership of
electrical generating facilities. 2  Improving management by
allowing control and ownership of electrical generating facilities is
accomplished by either "privatization" or "capitalization."83
a. Privatization
When a country turns to "privatization" to infuse new
management, the government sells assets, like an electrical
generating facility, to a private investor. 4  The private investor
then wholly owns the asset.85 Just as the utility is infused with new
management, the national treasury is infused with capital in the
amount of the private investor's purchase price, thereby allowing
the government to plug a fiscal deficit or to spend on state
priorities.86
79 See Siddique, supra note 12, at 19.
80 See generally Beth McGoldrick, The 1O Most Creative Deals of 1994,
INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., Feb.-Mar. 1995, at 25 (discussing various elements of deals).
81 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 20.
82 See id.
83 See generally id. at 20-23 (discussing privatization and capitalization in energy
sector restructuring).
84 See id. at 22 ("Privatization requires the transfer of ownership, as well as
operational and administrative control, to the private sector.").
85 See id. (noting that there are many techniques of privatizaton, including wholly
owning the asset).
86 See id. at 24 ("Privatization has been an effective tool for improving the fiscal
health of a country by immediately reducing.., the national debt."). Interestingly, many
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b. Capitalization
Under a capitalization scheme, a government contributes a
specific state asset that is matched by a capital contribution from a
private investor equivalent to the market value of the asset.87 A
new corporation, generally jointly owned by the government and
the private-sector "strategic investor," is formed to hold and
manage the asset.8  The private investor administers or manages
the new corporation as its single largest stockholder. Under a
capitalization scheme, a nation benefits not only from the infusion
of new management, but also from the fact that the capital remains
with the company for new investment and production-an
important benefit. 9  Moreover, for example in Bolivia, the
government has sold its share of capitalized utility stock to an
employee trust, thereby funding a retirement system.
3. Maximization of Competition
Some nations are opting to maximize competition in order to
increase downward pressure on costs and prices. 91 Capitalism's
conventional wisdom suggests that a nation's need for a new
supply of energy is best filled by unleashing market forces, so long
as inter-utility transmission is reasonably available to all who need
it.92 This is achieved primarily by transforming transmission
systems into the functional equivalent of common carriers for
transactions between generators and utilities that sell to end-
users.93 As a study by the British House of Commons suggested,
increased competition "create[s] downward pressure on costs and
of the world's lending institutions support privatization because it allows for a complete
infusion of new management and, subsequently, operational efficiency.
87 See id. at 20 (discussing recent trends in commercialization).
88 See id.
89 See MINISTRY OF CAPITALIZATION OF BOLIVIA, CAPITALIZATION MONITOR 1 (Oct.
30, 1994).
90 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 20.
91 See Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 22-23 (noting that the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and elements of the faculties at Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology are among the most enthusiastic of supporters of
the deregulation of electric utilities).
92 See id. at 23.
93 See id.
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prices, and ensure[s] that the customer, not the producer or
distributor, comes first."94 In essence, increased competition is an
attempt to reduce costs and to boost supplies by spurring increased
competition in the sale of kilowatt-hours."
4. Development of New Technologies
Another trend finds national governments encouraging the
development of new technologies in an attempt to reshape their
utility industries.96 An example of technology development is the
advent of new generation technologies,97 which have the potential
of revolutionizing the electric power industry in much the same
way the computer chip revolutionized business office machines
and the communication industry.9" Governments are advocating
the development of technologies with a view towards improving
energy efficiency and harnessing renewable energy resources
economically and competitively.99 Some suggest that these nations
give only lip service to developing new technologies, but others
point to the global treaty signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 as evidence of sincerity."00
Whether governments will support new technologies by
merely encouraging research and development or by directly
94 HOUSE OF COMMONS ENERGY COMMITTEE, 1 CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRICITY
PRIVATIZATION 31 (1992) (discussing the underlying philosophy of privatization of the
publicly owned electricity supply industry in England and Wales by the government of
the United Kingdom).
95 See Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 23.
96 See Roger D. Stark, Private Investment in Latin American Infrastructure: The
Next Wave, TRANSACTIONAL FIN. (McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, D.C.), Apr.
1993, at 7, 7-8.
97 New generation technologies include gas turbines, wind turbines, and new
electronic control technologies---each with varying degrees of proven performance in
the field.
91 See Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 58, at 7-9.
99 See United Kingdom, INT'L PRIVATE POWER QUARTERLY, Second Quarter 1995,
at 263 [hereinafter United Kingdom, Second Quarter 1995] (describing the desire of the
government of the United Kingdom to increase private cogeneration projects).
100 See generally CHRISTOPHER FLAVIN & NICHOLAS LENSSEN, POWER SURGE:
GUIDE TO THE COMING ENERGY REVOLUTION 297-98 (1994) ("The world has now
pledged to fundamentally transform an energy system that has served us well for many
decades but that now puts our future at risk.").
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subsidizing the technologies through such measures as tax
increases or mandatory purchases is yet to be determined. 1 A
look at Brazil's response to the 1992 Earth Summit initiatives
provides some insight into this unanswered question. Following
the 1992 Earth Summit, Brazil went to the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), asking it to provide financial support
for an investigation of ways to encourage energy efficiency and
co-generation.12  This illustrates the typical response of
developing nations: if an international institution agrees to fund a
study, then a national government will conduct a study.
IlI. The Unbundled Electricity Model
The most significant trend in the worldwide reform of the
electric utility industry is the move towards the implementation of
a "fully unbundled, competitive electricity market" model by an
ever-increasing number of nations."3 In the context of the
electricity market, unbundling is the breaking up of an electric
utility monopoly into three distinct areas: generation,
transmission, and distribution.14  The United Kingdom was the
first to unbundle it's electric power industry. 5  The United
Kingdom's experiment in creating an unbundled competitive
electricity market was followed by the institutionalization of
similar unbundled schemes in Chile,0 6 Peru,0 7 Argentina,' 8 and
101 See generally Burr, Survival, supra note 56, at 10-12 (discussing the ways in
which nations support new technology).
102 See id. at 11.
103 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19-20; see also Roger D. Feldman,
Public-Private Ventures-A Strategy for Market Penetration, INT'L Bus. & TRADE
BRIEFS (McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, D.C.), May 1, 1991, at 10; see also
Siddique, supra note 12, at 18.
104 See Churchill, supra note 75, at 30 (discussing the components of the electricity
industry that may be unbundled); see also Siddique, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that an
"important structural change that is occurring in many countries is the separation of
generation from the transmission and distribution of power").
105 See Pope, supra note 9, at A10.
106 See Ley No 18.959, Ley General de Servicios Electricos (July 1992) (Chile)
(Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles de Chile); see also CHILE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 10-11 (discussing Chile's unbundled
scheme).
107 See Ley No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions (1993) (Peru).
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Bolivia."9
This section of the Article will review the implementation of
the Littlechild model in the United Kingdom. It will then explore
Peru's adoption of an unbundling scheme as an illustration of the
way in which the unbundled, competitive electricity market model
was and continues to be adapted in Latin America. This section
will also briefly consider the ways in which the model has been
enacted in Bolivia and Argentina.
A. The Littlechild Model in the United Kingdom
1. Implementation
In 1988, Stephen Littlechild, a British academic, proposed an
incentive-based utility rate scheme"' that was adopted by the
Conservative-led government of the United Kingdom in its push
for a "free market" change in direction from a central, "socialized"
utility system."' With the enactment of the Electricity Act of
1989, "2 the British government split apart the monopoly of its
government-operated electricity system and opened it up to new
independent developers."3
The United Kingdom's version of the Littlechild model splits
the electric power industry into three distinct components:
generation, transmission, and distribution."14 It also deals with two
components that, while less distinct, are significant: marketing
and regulation."5
108 See Ley No. 24.065 (1992), Electrical Energy Law, 27.306 Boletin Official de
Argentina 1 (16 Gueves 1992) (Arg.); see also HELOU & PARDINA, supra note 15, at § 1.
109 See Ley de Electricidad (Law of Electricity) No. 1488 (Dec. 20, 1994) (Bol.).
110 For a more complete discussion of the genesis of the Littlechild model, see
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
I See Churchill, supra note 75, at 57 (describing the recent experiences of the
British electricity industry); see also Pope, supra note 9, at A 10.
I2 See Electricity Act, Ch. 29 (1989) (Eng.).
"3 See Edison Electric Institute, The British Model and Assessment, Power Supply
Monograph No. 2 (Mar. 29, 1995).
I" See Woolf, supra note 11, at 56 ("The electricity industry in the United
Kingdom was recently privatized and restructured, resulting in separate generation,
transmission, and distribution companies.").
"5 See id. at 57.
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a. Generation
One of the major components of the subdivided British
electricity utility is the generation component. In implementing
the Littlechild model, the government sold its generation units to
private-sector investors.'1 6 In addition to privatizing the existing
generation units, the government also allowed Independent Power
Producers (IPPs) to enter the market, thereby providing
competition in the generation sector."'
b. Transmission
The National Grid Company, the owner and manager of the
United Kingdom's transmission network, is owned by the twelve
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) that, in turn, own and
operate the distribution system.' The National Grid Company
(NGC) is responsible for the bulk transfer of electricity and the
coordination of individual power plants in order to match supply
and demand."9 Interestingly, for peak capacity, the NGC operates
2000 megawatts of "pumped-storage hydro capacity."' 2
c. Distribution
The government also privatized the distribution system--the
system that supplies retail electricity to customers. 2' The
government established the twelve RECs to collectively own and
operate the distribution system.12  The government franchised
each REC to ensure distribution of electricity to all, but it also
allowed other entities to compete with the regional electricity
116 See id.
"7 See id. See generally Stephen Peppiatt, Introduction to Power Station Project
Financing, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 46 (1995) (discussing Independent Power Project
Financing).
118 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57.
119 See id.
120 See United Kingdom, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 99, at 262.
121 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57; see also United Kingdom, Second Quarter
1995, supra note 101, at 262.
122 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57; see also United Kingdom, Second Quarter
1995, supra note 101, at 262 (noting that the distribution of electricity falls to the 12
RECs).
1997] 469
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
companies to supply electricity within each franchise."3
Generators, both the privatized generating companies and the
IPPs, were able to sell retail electricity to any customer using more
than 100 kilowatts of electricity. 24 The British government plans
to extend this competition to all customers by 1998.125
d. Marketing
The government established an Electricity Pool, thereby
creating a spot market in electricity. 126  The Electricity Pool
decides upon the dispatch of power plants and provides a forum in
which prices are set and payments for electricity traded are
distributed. 7 In addition, the Electricity Pool provides payments
to encourage electricity developers to construct plants that will
generate capacity to satisfy peak demand. 8
e. Regulation
The government of the United Kingdom also established the
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) to oversee the nation's
privatized electricity industry. 129 The OFFER establishes pricing
formulas for all three segments of the privatized electricity
industry-the generation, the transmission, and the distribution
businesses. 3 ° For instance, in both the generation and the
distribution segments, the pricing formulas established by the
OFFER are based on a price cap tied to inflation.131
123 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57.
124 See Steve Thomas, Electric Reform in Great Britain: An Imperfect Model, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., 1996, at 20, 22. When first enacted, the law limited retail electricity sales
to customers using more than one megawatt of electricity. See id. Subsequent
government action decreased the amount to 100 kilowatts in 1994. See id. The
government of the United Kingdom intends to extend retail competition to all customers
by 1998. See id.
125 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id.
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2. Results of Implementation
a. Profit Motive
In implementing the Littlechild model, the United Kingdom
restructured its rate base for both generators and distributors,
establishing pricing formulas based on a price cap tied to
inflation."' Under the price cap, the distributors (i.e., the RECs)
may increase prices to customers at a rate 2.5% higher than the
official rate of inflation in the United Kingdom.'33 As an incentive,
the distributors are allowed to retain as profit the difference
between the price cap and their operational costs, if the costs are
below the price cap.3 4  Conversely, if distributors are unable to
contain costs and their costs exceed the price cap, then they lose
money. 35 Thus, due to the pricing system, distributors in the
United Kingdom have an economic incentive to minimize costs.'36
In other words, the Littlechild model motivates distributors to
purchase the least expensive forms of generated electricity in order
to drive down generation costs in the short-term.3
b. New Capacity-Gas, Co-generation, and
Expansions
The important point from the perspective of the renewable
energy industry-which is dependent on long-term power
purchase agreements-is that the Littlechild market focuses on
short-term generation costs, de-emphasizes longer range capacity
considerations, making long-term power purchase agreements
difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate.' This limitation on
132 See id. For purposes of comparison, the electric utilities in the United States use
a rate base rate-of-return approach. See id.
133 See United Kingdom, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 99, at 264 (discussing
the pricing system and noting that the RECs increased prices by the maximum amount
"for the last five years").
134 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57-58.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 58.
137 See id.
138 See id. ("This puts a significant damper on large capital investments (e.g.,
baseload plant), risky investments (e.g., renewables), or demand-side management
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renewable capacity expansion, however, has not impeded
construction of generation facilities that do not require high front-
end expenditures. Following the implementation of the Littlechild
model, construction of new capacity in the United Kingdom
continued. "' In fact, between 1989-the year in which the
privatization of the electric power industry in the United Kingdom
began-and 1995, the. British government received applications to
build twenty-eight new plants, totaling 22,370 megawatts.
140
Slightly more than fifty percent of these new projects had been
financed. Much of this financed new capacity represented
expansion of existing facilities.14' The overwhelming majority of
the new plants that were financed were to be gas-fired. 142 Of the
remaining plants, 660 megawatts were to be lignite-fired,143 over
900 megawatts were to be waste-fired,144 and approximately 100
megawatts were to be wind energy. 145 Notably, the establishment
of the new wind energy capacity was funded under the United
Kingdom's renewable set-aside program.
14 6
c. Renewable Set-Asides
The Littlechild model is based on a theoretical notion of
perfect competition in the market system, free from government
interference.:4' In practice, however, the government of the United
Kingdom has remained involved in nearly every aspect of the
(DSM).").
139 See generally United Kingdom, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 99, at 253-64
(describing the construction of new power projects).
140 See id. at 263 (discussing the private power needs of the United Kingdom).
141 See generally id. at 254-62 (describing the new power projects in the United
Kingdom).
142 See id. at 256-58.
143 See id. at 259 (describing two coal-fired plants).
144 See id. at 259-60 (describing eight waste-fired plants).
145 See id. at 260 (describing twelve wind projects and noting that National Wind
plans to develop 250 megawatts of wind energy by 2000).
146 See id. at 260 (noting that qualified wind power projects receive a special rate
under the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation). It is also interesting to note that the majority of
the smaller plants, 200 megawatts or less, that had been financed were co-generation
units. See id. at 256-59.
147 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 57.
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electricity industry after its Littlechild model implementation.'48
For instance, one such intrusion was the establishment of the Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), a levy added to all retail electricity
sales and used, in part, to subsidize nuclear energy.
1 4 9
The NFFO was also designed to help finance renewable
resource developers.5 ' By providing a subsidy, the British
government hoped to assist the private sector to overcome the
barriers to developing renewable resources, especially the financial
barriers created by the perceived high risks.'51 In 1993, the
government of the United Kingdom expanded application of the
NFFO in order to provide renewable developers up to fifteen to
twenty years of financing.'52 The British government also set a
goal of financing 1500 megawatts of renewable capacity by the
turn of the century."'
In addition to these set-asides, the government of the United
Kingdom created an Energy Savings Trust in order to reduce the
costs of electricity and to meet environmental goals. 154  In
establishing the Energy Savings Trust to increase energy
efficiency, the government intended to finance this program by
charging a fee to all electricity and gas customers.'55 This method
of funding has been criticized as a regressive tax, and there is
reason to believe that the trust may never achieve its purposes.116
In short, both the NFFO subsidy and the Energy Savings Trust
were created to encourage the establishment of renewable
resources in a competitive market system that would otherwise
turn its back on renewable resources due to development costs.157
148 See generally id. at 56-62 (discussing the many ways in which the British
government remains actively involved in the privatized electricity industry).
149 See id. at 63 n.14 (discussing the establishment of the NFFO).
150 See id.
15, See id.
152 See id.
113 See id.; see also NFF03 Bid Prices Plummet, POWER IN EUROPE, Jan. 12, 1995,
at 8.
154 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 63 n. 14.
'5 See id.
156 See id. at 61.
157 See id.
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3. Consumer Prices
In enacting the Littlechild model, the United Kingdom's stated
goal was to "create downward pressure on costs and prices, and
[to] ensure that the customer, not the producer or distributor,
comes first."'58 In other words, one measure of the success of
implementation of the Littlechild model is the price to the
consumer. Commentators and analysts have reached diametrically
opposite conclusions about whether the goal of lower electricity
prices has been achieved. 59 Some observers, including the House
of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, have concluded that
cost savings have not found their way to customers.160 In fact, the
Trade and Industry Committee indicated that residential prices
averaged twenty percent to twenty-five percent higher than would
have been expected based on pre-privatization trends and that
industrial prices averaged nineteen percent higher. 6' In contrast,
in 1995, a consultant to the U.S. Department of Energy, after
reviewing the reformed British system, concluded that, while
nominal prices are up by six percent to twenty-four percent, real
prices are generally down by one percent to ten percent.
162
One observer, Gordon MacKerron, senior fellow at the Science
Policy Research Institute of the University of Sussex, commenting
on the United Kingdom's system, noted that prices increased just
before privatization and that price reductions were not realized by
the consumers for approximately five years. 163 MacKerron
151 See Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 23.
159 See generally Woolf, supra note 11, at 62 (discussing the different views that
analysts have of the implementation of the Littlechild model in the United Kingdom).
160 See HOUSE OF COMMONS TRADE & INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, BRITISH ENERGY
POLICY AND THE MARKET FOR COAL 295 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter TRADE & INDUSTRY
COMMITTEE] (reporting that the shareholders of the regulated electric distribution
companies, not the customers, were the beneficiaries of privatization and efficiency); see
also Woolf, supra note 11, at 57-58 (noting that "customers have not yet seen any
benefits of privatization in terms of electricity prices" (citing G. YARROW, BRITISH
ELECTRICITY PRICES SINCE PRIVATIZATION 33 (1992))).
161 See TRADE & INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, supra note 160, at 295.
162 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ELECTRIC ENERGY
RESTRUCTURING 20 (June 6, 1995) (report prepared by Brattle/IRI) (describing the
British electricity industry and discussing lessons that can be drawn from it).
163 See Warnings on Restructuring from Abroad, SOLAR LETTER, July 7, 1995, at
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observed that "in generation, the market has been dominated by
the two incumbent private generators, to such an extent that
OFFER ... has imposed a two-year price control on the 'pool' (the
wholesale market) and is trying to force both companies to divest"
plant ownership in the amount of nearly 6000 megawatts.' 64 He
also noted that, in order to achieve lower prices, the government
originally foresaw dividing the generation assets into three
companies and encouraging new private sector participants in the
generation sector as part of horizontal reforms for the industry.'65
In addition, the British government attempted to stimulate
reductions in customers' prices by allowing customers a choice of
suppliers, thereby increasing competition among suppliers and
stimulating price reductions. 66  Thus, beginning in 1990, the
government planned to allow customers with a demand of more
than one megawatt to have a free choice of suppliers.1
67
Thereafter, the government was to extend choice of suppliers to
100-kilowatt customers in 1994 and to all 22 million consumers in
1998.168 In short, the privatization of the electric utility industry in
the United Kingdom has not resulted in timely price reductions for
169
consumers.
The question of how long a new system must be in place
before the effect of competition on prices flows through to
customers remains open. Until that question is answered, it should
at least be noted that the corporate profits of these private
electricity companies have risen.70 In March 1995, Stephen
Littlechild, as director general of the United Kingdom's Office of
219 [hereinafter Warnings] (noting that the United Kingdom's experiment with the
Littlechild model revealed that "renewables and other sources could be in for some
trouble in as so-called competitive market"). See generally GORDON MACKERRON, THE
U.K. ENERGY EXPERIENCE: A MODEL OR A WARNING? (1996) (discussing the effects of
the adoption of the Littlechild model in the United Kingdom).
164 Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 See id.
166 See Thomas, supra note 124, at 22.
167 See Warnings, supra note 163, at 219.
168 See id. (noting that MacKerron believed the 1998 goal to be possible only if
there was a large expansion in regulatory powers).
169 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 62.
170 See United Kingdom, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 99, at 263-64.
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Electricity Regulator, announced that a new round of electric
company price controls was being studied with a view towards
decreasing the profits that have passed through to private utility
stockholders. 7'
B. The Unbundled Electricity Model in Peru
The reforms of Peru's President Alberto Fujimori graphically
illustrate the policy concerns that underlie the reforms that are
opening the Latin American market in the electricity sector and
producing opportunities and challenges for U.S. renewable energy
industries. The centerpiece of President Fujimori's policy reforms
was the decision to shift politico-economic decision-making from
the government to the free market, thereby allowing economic
decisions to be based on market signals rather than structured
planning.' Peru's adoption of this policy will have profound
implications on the renewable industries as they attempt to gain
toeholds in Peru.
1. Historical Background
National policy is seldom established in a vacuum, and its full
import cannot be appreciated except in the historical context in
which it came into being. In the early 1990s, Peru's politico-
economic picture was dismal.'73 The terrorist activities of Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path), a group of freedom fighters, threatened
the stability of the government, the personal safety of the citizens,
and the active life of the community. 74 Moreover, Peru had been
bankrupt since 1987, and the inflation rate had soared to
171 See id. at 263; see also Pope, supra note 9, at A1O ("In a sign of how tough
times have become for the electric utilities, the first of a new round of rate cuts, some as
much as 4%, began yesterday.").
172 See Alan Kovski, Petroperu sell-off delayed until elections; firms poised to take
plunge into upstream, OIL DAILY, Jan. 19, 1995, at I (discussing the 1995 Peruvian
elections and the reform efforts led by Fujimori). See generally Peru, Second Quarter
1995, supra note 13, at 188-91 (discussing the-purposes behind the reforms in the
electricity industry in Peru).
173 See generally id. at 189 (discussing the business climate in Peru).
174 See generally id. at 190 ("Peruvian businesses spend between 2% and 7% of
their annual operating budget on security measures to protect against terrorists.").
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remarkable levels. 75 Then, in 1990, the country elected the little-
known Alberto Fujimori, an independent, on an anti-corruption
platform. 76 In an extraordinary series of actions designed to end
the activities of the terrorists and to revive the economy, President
Fujimori dismissed the parliament, replaced it with an unelected
Constitute Congress, introduced a new constitution, and launched
a successful anti-terrorist campaign.1
77
In perhaps an even more extraordinary action, President
Fujimori, after first consolidating enormous power in his
government, transferred much of that power to the private-
sector.178 In the process, his government initiated constitutional,
legislative, and regulatory reforms designed to inhibit, if not
prevent, reversion to a government-dominated economy. 179  By
reducing government size,'. much of the resistance to change
generated by entrenched government bureaucracies disappeared.
In response to these reforms, inflation dropped dramatically,'81 the
gross national product jump-started at ten percent and leveled off
at a respectable five percent to six percent, and, in 1996, Peruvians
expressed their support for the reforms by re-electing President
Fujimori.' 2
175 See id. at 189 (noting that Peru was still negotiating with the international
banking community to relieve some of its $18.5 billion foreign debt and that the
inflation rate was 3400% in 1989).
176 See ELECTROPERU S.A., PRIVATISATION OF THE ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND
TRANSMISSION BUSINESSES OF THE CENTRO NORTE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM OF
ELECTROPERU S.A. 3A (N.M. Rothschild & Sons Limited, Sept. 1994) [hereinafter
PRIVATISATION] (profiling the privatization effort in the country of Peru).
177 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 190 (reviewing the political
tactics employed by Fujimori in his reform effort, and noting that Abimeal Guzman, the
leader of Sendero Luminoso, was captured).
178 See generally id. at 188 (noting that, in 1992, the Peruvian government
"removed virtually all barriers to the private ownership and operation of generating,
transmission and distribution facilities").
179 See id. at 189-90.
180 See PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at 3A. For instance, in the case of the
Ministry of Energy and Mines, as many as nine out of ten employees were "retired."
181 See generally Peru, Second Quarter 199,5, supra note 13, at 189 (noting that
inflation fell from 3400% in 1989 to about 60% in 1992); PRIVATISATION, supra note
176,at 3A (noting that inflation dropped from 7000% in 1990 to 39% in 1993).
182 See Peru Re-elects Alberto Fujimori, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 16, 1995, at 82A.
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Peru's private-sector policies were designed to help it meet
immediate national goals.'83  The sale of government assets
alleviated some of the country's debt burden, entrepreneurial
investment bolstered the economy, and competition lowered
consumer prices.'84 In fact, Peru is relying upon the private-sector
to an unprecedented extent to fund its strategic reserves, to pay its
international debt, and to handle long-term strategic planning.8 5
However, using the private-sector to meet short-term goals may
have created long-term problems in the electricity sector.
Renewable generating facilities and rural electrification
development have to be funded and made attractive to a private
industry that has cherry-picked the choice generation and
distribution assignments.
2. Unbundling Peru's Electricity Market
President Fujimori's privatization policies are embodied in the
restructured electricity sector in Peru.'86 As the electricity sector
currently operates, all energy sources in Peru compete within a
fully unbundled, competitive electricity market in which
government action is very limited.'87
Peru used three mechanisms to institutionalize the free market
system in the electricity sector. First, Peru privatized the
electricity industry by transferring state-owned electricity
companies to private investors.' 8 Second, Peru fully unbundled its
electricity market by splitting the electricity power industry into
three distinct components--generation, transmission, and
distribution-and by keeping a company in one subsector from
183 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189-90; see also Moore &
DePinto, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing the ways in which nations reap the benefits of
privatization).
184 See generally Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189-90 (describing
improvements to Peru's business climate)
185 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 24; see also Peru, Second Quarter 1995,
supra note 13, at 189-90.
186 See Burr, Success, supra note 18, at 23; see also Kovski, supra note 172, at 1
(discussing the privatization of Peru's electricity industry).
187 See id; see also Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 188.
188 See Burr, Success, supra note 19, at 23.
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owning a company in another."9 Finally, Peru established a
competitive electricity market by treating the sale of electricity as
a commercial business.19°
The government of Peru opted to "privatize" its electricity
infrastructure, as opposed to Bolivia's government, which decided
to "capitalize" its electric industry. 19' Under Bolivia's
capitalization scheme, the government retains a non-controlling
interest in the state electricity assets; thus, the private investor does
not wholly own an electrical plant, rather the private investor
makes a capital contribution that remains with the company and is
channeled into new investment and production for that plant or
company.' 92  Peru, however, decided to privatize its electric
utilities, because it needed an infusion of hard currency in order to
stabilize its national bank reserves, thereby allowing it to emerge
from international bankruptcy.19' Thus, the proceeds from the
sales of government assets to the private sector enabled Peru to
service its debts pursuant to its agreements with the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Paris Club.
194
In privatizing the electric power sector, Peru divided the sector
into three primary components-generation, transmission, and
distribution.'95 Like the United Kingdom, Peru included marketing
and regulation in its privatized electricity sector.'
First, Peru divided its generation component into ten units,
seven in the Central North Interconnected System (SICN) and
three in the South Interconnected System (SIS). The country is in
the process of privatizing the ten major generation units that
189 See id. (discussing the unbundling of the electricity industry).
190 See id. (noting that Peru instituted "an innovative electricity pricing system that
uses market rates to set marginal cost tariffs").
191 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 186; Bolivia, Second Quarter
1995, supra note 14, at 24.
192 See Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at 26.
193 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 24.
194 See generally id. (discussing the ways in which privatization allows nations to
reduce their national debts).
195 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions (1993) (Peru); see
also Burr, Success, supra note 19, at 23.
196 See id.
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comprise this system. Peru opted to privatize this sector by
offering a majority interest in the assets of a generating station or
of a group of generating stations.197
The government established eleven regional distribution
companies, ten of which are connected to the main transmission
systems--seven to SICN, three to SIS. The distribution
companies are also in the process of selling a sixty percent interest
in each of the distribution companies.
In addition, Peru is planning to establish a private transmission
company in each of the interconnected systems in the nation.98
Then, the Peruvian government intends to privatize the primary
transmission assets in each of the interconnected grid sectors.
The reformed Peruvian electricity industry, like the United
Kingdom's scheme, is organized to create a spot market in
electricity. The primary transmitters and significant generators in
each interconnected system are required to establish an electricity
pool, named the Committee for the Economic Operation of the
System (COES).'99  The COES must perform certain basic
functions, including the performance of the calculations to be used
by the autonomous regulatory authority, the Electrical Tariffs
Commission (CTE).2°° The COES guarantees member generators
the sale of all their firm capacity at the regulated price, as well as
the purchase or sale of energy at the short-run marginal cost.20'
197 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 190 (discussing the way in
which the parts of the electricity industry will be sold to the private sector).
198 The two major systems are the Centro Norte Interconnected System and the Sur
Interconnected System. See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions,
Temporary Provisions (1993) (Peru). In addition, there are a number of isolated and
small scale electricity systems.
199 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189 (discussing the need to
form COESs).
200 See generally id. (discussing the important functions of the Electricity Tariffs
Commission). The Electricity Tariffs Commission is also translated as the Electric Rates
Commission. See id.
201 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 41 (1993)
(Peru).
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The CTE regulates electricity prices."2 The COES performs
the calculations, 3 while the CTE sets the regulated tariffs. 24 The
Peruvian electricity law provides for the regulation of prices for
three things: (1) the sale of electricity to distribution concessions
for the purpose of supplying Public Electricity Service
Customers;25 (2) payments for use of transmission systems; °6 and
(3) sales of capacity and energy between generators up to the firm
capacity and energy of the purchaser.20 ' The law specifically states
that the prices for other sales and activities will not be regulated.2 8
Peru's fully unbundled, competitive electricity market
resembles the Littlechild model. The Peruvian privatization is set
forth in the Electricity Concessions Law that was promulgated in
November 1992.209 This law defines four types of transactions
within the Peruvian market. The first transaction is the "Free
Market," and it is applied between major customers whose
consumption exceeds one megawatt. Second, the "Spot Market"
applies to transactions at a given moment under unforeseen
conditions of supply and demand. Third, the "Inter Generator
Market" is for transactions between 'electricity generating
202 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189. The CTE has five
members. See id. CTE members are selected from the industry ministry, the energy and
mines industry, the economy and finance ministry, the transmission concessionaires, and
the generation concessionaires. See id. In order to be a member of the board, a director
must have at least fifteen years experience in the industry, must have a good reputation,
and must be professionally competent. See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical
Concessions, art. 12 (1993) (Peru). There is also a long list of things that will keep a
person from serving as a director; this list is aimed at preventing conflicts of interest.
See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 14 (1993) (Peru).
203 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 41 (1993)
(Peru).
204 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189 ("[T]he Electric Rates
Commission (CTE) will set, review and modify rates.").
205 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 43(c) (1993)
(Peru). See generally Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 2
(1993) (Peru) (regarding public electricity service). Public Electricity Service
Customers 'are electricity consumers whose maximum demand is less than one
megawatt.
206 See id., art. 43(b).
207 See id art. 43(a).
208 See id. art. 44.
209 See id.
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companies. These transactions are calculated at marginal cost
corresponding to real time system operation. Finally, the "Public
Service Market" is used by customers whose consumption is less
than one megawatt. The rates for these transactions are fixed by a
calculus incorporating short-term marginal cost plus distribution
value-added costs.
3. New Capacity Under the Littlechild Model as Enacted
in Peru
The Littlechild model, in its various manifestations, does not
set forth a comprehensive framework to guide the process of
bringing new generation on line. In this respect, it is particularly
interesting to consider the way a nation's unbundled electricity
industry, which generally uses short-term pricing, makes long-
term plans for new electricity generation. Peru's experience in
long-term planning in the electricity industry serves as an
example.
a. No Long-Term System Planning or Load
Forecasting Makes it Difficult to Justify Resource
Exploration
Although the government of Peru ostensibly retained a vestige
of its long-term planning responsibility, it in fact gave up a good
deal of its long-term planning authority.2 ° Under the Law of
Electrical Concessions, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM)
is responsible for a Reference Plan, which is a tentative program
that studies the generation and transmission projects that will
cover medium-term demand growth.2 1' Although the MEM grants
concessions and authorizations to prospective generators 12 and has
control over new entrants, it retains neither the fiscal wherewithal
to finance nor the mandate to enforce private-sector development
of new generation capacity.2  The CTE is responsible for
210 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 188.
211 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, Definition Annex
(1993) (Peru) (defining the Reference Plan in the Peruvian electricity system).
212 See generally id. arts. 22-38 (setting forth the powers of the MEM with respect
to concessions and authorizations).
213 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 188-89 (discussing the
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conducting the relevant studies and for setting forth the
replacement cost of transmission and distribution systems in
setting electricity tariffs, but the CTE is not responsible for the
generation systems. 4
A system analysis of electricity generation in Peru falls, in the
first instance, to the electricity pool."5 For instance, in Peru, the
COES is charged with "guaranteeing the reliability of the electrical
energy supply" for the entire nation. 6 In this regard, each COES
is obligated to project a forty-eight month demand from among the
customers in its system and to plan a generation and transmission
works program, taking into account both works under construction
and works contemplated in the Reference Plan prepared by the
MEM.217 Since some of the members of the COES are, by law,
representatives of the existing generator concessionaires,21 they
may have a conflict of interest that could effectively discourage
the growth of new generator capacity from sources other than the
existing generator concessionaires.
Practically, the impetus for expansion of new generator
capacity falls to the distributor concessionaires. The distributor
concessionaires have the most obvious motivation for encouraging
the development of new generation concessions and more
economical generation concessions within a grid.219 In addition to
the distributor concessionaires, the existing generation
concessionaires are also in a position to play a decisive role in
determining new capacity for the system. Since the Electrical
Concessions Law allows generators to market power and energy in
any busbar of the main transmission system and to connect to the
main system through secondary systems,"' each of the generation
MEM's regulatory role).
214 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 18(j) (1993)
(Peru).
215 See Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189.
216 Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 39 (1993) (Peru).
217 See id. art. 47; see also Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 189.
218 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 39 (1993)
(Peru).
219 It should be noted, however, that generator concessionaires may contract with
third parties for power. See id. art. 40(f) (1993) (Peru).
220 See id. arts. 58-60.
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concessionaires is in a position to consider system capacity in
much the same way that a central governing authority or utility is
in a position to consider system capacity under the electric utility
monopoly model. It is less clear, however, to what extent all of
the generation concessionaires within a single transmission system
will be allowed to jointly study and act on system long-term
planning due to the anti-monopoly policies in place in Peru.
b. Pricing Characteristics
There are two fundamental pricing characteristics in Peru's
scheme. These pricing characteristics will determine the fate of
any proposed investment in generating capacity. First, when a
generator contracts with a distributor to supply capacity and
electricity that is destined for the general consumer, the generator
is prohibited from agreeing to a fixed price that exceeds the busbar
price that was calculated by the electricity pool and set by the
CTE. Second, when a distributor enters into a contractual
relationship with a generating company, the contract must, by law,
be for a minimum term of twenty-four months. 2' Contracts may
include terms that are longer than twenty-four months, but it is
difficult to imagine a distributor's motivation to enter into a
contract for a longer term, unless it receives a price break for
entering the agreement.
The Peruvian system was designed to encourage the
development of only those generation facilities that are likely to
meet cost and profit requirements at a price below the foreseeable
busbar rates. Firm-price private power projects that are developed
in nations that have not adopted the Littlechild or Southern Cone
system have some flexibility in planning for rising costs. In Peru,
or other nations that have adopted one of these models, however, a
generator developing a new generating facility must be concerned
that the costs of the utility system will change and that the costs of
the new systems, like cost overruns, will effect the costs of the
system as a whole and, subsequently, the busbar rates. In the way
that the formulas adopted by Peru actually work, prices will
always lag behind the actual costs of new facilities.
221 See id. art. 34(b).
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c. • Power Purchase Agreement in the Peruvian
Version of the Littlechild Model
In undertaking the financing and construction of an
'infrastructure facility, the heart of the private-sector investment is
the contractual arrangement that allows the investor to charge fees
sufficient to allow the investor to recover construction costs,
operating costs, and maintenance costs, and to afford the investor
an opportunity to receive a reasonable profit. The price that
consumers pay is an important factor in stimulating private power
development, and the predictability of recapturing costs is
essential to financing development. The way in which predictable
prices effectively stimulate private-sector investment is evidenced
by the results of the U.S. Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978
(PURPA) 22  For example, following the enactment of the
PURPA, the California Public Utilities Commission developed a
series of standard fixed price contracts to be used by the private
power developers wanting to sell power to the utility grid. As a
result of these "take-and-pay" contracts, more than ten thousand
megawatts of private generation were brought on-line in
California.223
However, the "take-and-pay" agreements, like those used in
California, have met with worldwide resistance. For example, the
President and Director of the PLN, the state-owned electric utility
of Indonesia, stated that, while he recognizes that the lack of a
guaranteed price makes the private-sector reluctant to invest in
power production, governments should attempt to stimulate true
competition and to arrive at the least-cost generation mix, rather
than making take-and-pay guarantees.224
In theory, any new generating company, including a renewable
energy company, is allowed to come to Peru, receive a temporary
222 See Michael Oldak, PURPA in a Competitive Environment, EDISON TIMES, June
1995, at 12.
223 See generally USAID, SUMMARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRIVATE-SECTOR POWER GENERATION IN INDONESIA, REPORT
NUMBER 89-17 (1989) (reporting on a workshop that took place March 6-8, 1989 in
Jakarta, including a discussion of the success of PURPA in California).
224 See id. at 2.20.
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concession to carry out resource studies,225 receive a permanent
226
concession, generate electricity for sale to distributors, and
become a part of the COES. 227 Nevertheless, it seems clear that a
large scale hydropower or geothermal private-sector investor
would be financially unable to form a new generating company in
an undeveloped Peruvian market on pure speculation. The
conventional wisdom among private-sector developers is that there
are two conditions precedent to securing either equity or debt
financing: (1) an established or predictable market demand, and
(2) a commitment from a solvent customer. Thus, whether the
construction of new generating facilities is initiated by the
prospective generator or by the prospective distributor, the private-
sector investor will require a firm understanding that a customer
stands ready to purchase agreed to capacity and power when the
generating company is prepared to deliver that capacity and power.
d. Duration of Contracts
For all of its generation and distribution members, the COES
guarantees the sale of their contracted power, not to exceed the
limit of their firm power,22 at a regulated price.229 There are only
two regulated generator sales: (1) sales of electricity by generators
to distribution concessionaires for the purpose of supply to Public
Electricity Service Customers, who are defined as persons
requesting electric energy and located within a distribution
concession area;23° and (2) sales of capacity and energy between
generators up to the firm capacity and energy of the purchaser.
Distributors are required to enter into contracts with generators
225 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 22 (1993)
(Peru).
226 See id. art. 25.
227 See id. art. 39.
228 See id. (defining firm power as "the power that each generating unit can provide
in peak hours with a high degree of certainty, with a higher or equal probability as that
defined by the Regulations"). All of the firm power of the members of a COES "cannot
exceed the maximum demand of the interconnected service." Id.
229 See id. art. 41(0.
230 See id. art. 82.
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for capacity and energy for at least twenty-four month terms. 1
Sales under these contracts are effected at the busbar rates that are
set by the COESs.2 2 Distributors are allowed to enter into multi-
year contracts with prospective generators, including power
purchase agreements. Any power purchase agreement entered into
between a generator and a distributor is limited by the provisions
of the Law of Electrical Concessions, which, in effect, disallow
generators and distributors from contractually agreeing to fixed
tariffs for energy and capacity.233  The parties may not
contractually establish fixed tariffs, because the base tariff for
energy and the base tariff for capacity are calculated by the
COES.3  In order to calculate the base tariff for energy, the COES
semi-annually simulates the operation of the system for the next
forty-eight months and calculates the net present value of the
demand-weighted average expected short-run marginal cost for
each of the hourly blocks.235  The base tariff for capacity is also
determined semi-annually from a review of the annualized
investment and fixed operating cost of the type of generation that
would provide peak capacity at the lowest cost, assuming a twenty
year life for the generating equipment and a thirty year life for the
connection equipment.236 The base tariffs for both energy and
capacity are amended for each busbar by applying energy and peak
231 See id. art. 34(b).
232 Busbar Rates are the allowed tariffs for sales of capacity and energy by
generators to distribution concessionaires for the purpose of supplying Public Electricity
Service Customers. See id. art. 47 (describing the calculations used by each COES in
determining the busbar rates).
233 See generally id. arts. 45-73 (setting forth maximum prices).
234 See id. art. 47.
235 See id. arts. 46-47. As of May 1994, energy tariffs varied from an off-peak low
of U.S.$2.14 per per kilowatt hour to a peak high of U.S.$6.14 per kilowatt hour. See
PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at 29. The COES calculates the system short-run
marginal cost of energy in each hour in order to determine the base tariff for energy for
the hourly blocks for typical days, and to calculate and value member generators'
purchases and sales of energy at the system short-run marginal cost and sales of firm
capacity at regulated prices. See PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at 28-29.
236 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 46-47 (1993)
(Peru). For instance, by May 1994, the base tariff for capacity was U.S.$5.73 per
kilowatt per month for an open cycle gas turbine. See PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at
28.
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capacity loss factors to account for transmission losses.237
e. Generator-to-Generator Sales
The COES may best be conceptualized as an energy pool
established in a defined area, into which all dispatched generators
in that area sell the entirety of their output at a system marginal
cost for each hour and from which all distributors purchase their
needed energy at the system marginal cost for each hour.3 In
order to operate the system in the most cost effective manner, the
generation plants will be dispatched in accordance with an
ascending merit order that is determined by reviewing the
marginal costs of generation by each plant and first dispatching
energy from the plant that produces energy in the most
inexpensive manner.
Generators with high variable costs may not be dispatched;
nevertheless, they may meet their commitments by purchasing
energy from the COES pool of generators that is dispatched. 9
Such purchases of energy by generators will be priced at the short-
run marginal cost of the system.240 If generators are unavailable,
then those generators would also be allowed to purchase energy
from the COES pool at the system marginal cost. Generators with
low variable costs may be required to produce more energy than
the amounts they would produce to fulfill their contractual
commitments in order to sell the surplus through the COES at
system short-run marginal cost.
Contracts for the sale of energy and sales of energy to
distributors at busbar tariffs are not related to actual generation and
transactions in the energy pool. A generator's revenue from the
sale of energy can be determined with the following calculation:
237 See Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 47 (1993)
(Peru). As of May 1994, the base tariff at the busbars varied from U.S.S5.74 to
U.S.$6.84 per kilowatt per month. See PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at 29.
238 See generally Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, arts. 39-
41 (1993) (Peru) (setting forth the laws governing the COES).
239 See generally id. art. 43(a) (1993) (Peru) (noting that "'[p]ower and energy
transfers between generators" are governed by Article 41 of the Law of Electrical
Concessions).
240 See PRIVATISATION, supra note 176, at 33. The short-run marginal cost is
determined by "referring the generators' variable costs to the reference busbar." Id.
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the revenue derived from selling all of its output to the pool minus
its generating costs minus the cost of its purchases from the pool
for the purposes of fulfilling its contractual commitments plus the
revenue from sales to distributors. at busbar tariffs plus the revenue
from sales to other customers.
A generator may not enter contracts for more energy or
capacity than is allocated by the COES unless it purchases the
shortfall from the other generators. In the case of firm energy, 24 ' a
generator must have contracts in place before it can exceed its own
allocation, and the energy prices in these contracts are not subject
to regulation-meaning that the generator is supplying electricity
to a customer other than a distributor supplying to the Public
Electricity Service or another generator. In the case of firm
capacity, a generator may purchase the shortfall from other
generators at the regulated capacity tariff when needed.
f Sales to Unregulated Customers
The generator and the unregulated customer negotiate a price
for the sale of electricity. The Peruvian electricity law requires
that busbar tariffs may not differ by more than ten percent from the
price of such sales.2  In addition, generators are required to
submit to the CTE certain information about the sales that they
make to these unregulated customers. The CTE then compares
these sales figures with busbar rates to determine whether the
busbar rates need to be modified.
4. Rural Electrification
Peru has not yet established a comprehensive plan for rural
electrification. Most observers believe the Peruvian government
must play a much more direct role if the "have-not" areas of the
country are to be electrified. How the private-sector-oriented
policies of the Fujimori government can be applied in areas where
the market cannot afford electricity remains unanswered.
241 Firm Energy is defined as the "maximum electrical energy production
anticipated in conditions of dry hydrology for the units of hydroelectric generation and
of unavailability anticipated for the thermal generation units." Decree Law No. 25844,
Law of Electrical Concessions, Definitions Annex (1993) (Peru).
242 See id. arts. 53-56.
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5. The Renewable Energy Industry in Peru
From the perspective of the renewable industries, the Peruvian
adaptation of the Littlechild or Southern Cone model presents a
number of hurdles. First, the Peru Electricity Law places its
highest premium on encouraging distributors to buy the least
expensive electricity on the current market. Second, the
government transferred its long-term planning function, which
allowed for the planned development of long-term, strategic
electricity sources, to the private-sector. Finally, under the new
system in Peru, there is, arguably, no "obligation to supply" in the
historical utility sense whereby a government enforced the
requirements established to plan and to acquire adequate
generating capacity to meet future need. Despite the lack of an
"obligation to pay," the purchasers of Peru's government utilities
have undertaken some contractual expansion obligations.
In a system geared to short-term economic signals, compelling
reasons for distributors to enter into long-term power purchase
agreements with the dispatchable renewable energy generators are
difficult to envision. Front-end-loaded capital costs coupled with
long-term fuel and operating economies characterize the
development of renewable generation facilities. Long-term power
purchase agreements have, therefore, always been required for
self-financed, base-load or dispatchable, independent power
projects. Although Peru's electricity law guarantees to the
interconnected owners of generation plants and transmission
systems "the sale of their contracted power, up to the limit of their
firm power, at a regulated price, 243 most of the renewables, except
hydropower, remain unproven resources in Peru, and lending
institutions may view renewable energy generation facilities as a
high risk. That risk factor, along with the lack of the long-term
contracts that traditionally supported low equity investment
project financings, will make it difficult to steer potential
generators away from the more favorable equity requirements that
prevail in the conventional fuel arena. Consequently, it may be
virtually impossible for the prospective developers of greenfield
geothermal, hydropower, wind power, biomass, and solar sites to
243 See id. art. 41 (f).
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compete successfully if equity to debt ratios of fifty to fifty
become commonplace.
Paradoxically, one of the principal reasons Peru adopted its
version of the Littlechild or Southern Cone model was to create
new sources of capital for new generation capacity. In adopting
these privatization measures, the government seemed convinced
that a competitive marketplace will ultimately encourage new
capital expenditures in the electricity industry. Peru has remained
steadfast in its belief in competition; it has not accepted the
criticism that an emphasis on short-term market prices will
probably have a chilling effect on the financial market's
underwriting of private-sector investment. Thus, Peru has not
adopted the "strategic reserve" concept implemented in other
nations that have adopted versions of the Littlechild or Southern
Cone model, like the United Kingdom and Bolivia. For example,
in recognition of the importance of developing renewable
resources, the United Kingdom established a renewable set-aside
designed to achieve a nationally promoted goal of having 1500
megawatts of renewables on line by the turn of the century.2" For
purposes of comparison, Bolivia established a policy where, as an
exception to the general rule, distribution companies may own
generation facilities for meeting up to fifteen percent of their
projected load, provided that such generation facilities are based
on renewable resources. In the short term, the renewable energy
industry will probably need some government regulatory
assistance in order to succeed in nations that have adopted the
Littlechild or Southern Cone model. Such regulatory assistance is,
however, no different from any of the countries in which the
renewable electricity industry is already established. Historically,
the renewable electricity industry has depended on government
action to nurture it through its infancy and to enable it to mature to
the point that it can be competitive with established fuel sources.
Governments support the renewable technologies to the extent
that they believe there is a value in presently developing a
technical capability to tap indigenous fuels in the event of future
shortfalls in the supply of carbon fuels. In essence, they invest in a
244 For a discussion of the renewable set-asides in the United Kingdom, see supra
notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
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technology "strategic reserve." An added motivation is the fact
that the renewable resources are environmentally benign and can
be developed in remote locations, where they are cost-effective
components of a rural electrification strategy. In some nations,
like Indonesia, using renewable energy is economically strategic,
since hydrocarbons can be exported at premium prices when an
indigenous, substitute fuel can be used to generate electricity. In
Peru, however, direct government support is contrary to a public
policy that is based upon competition.
2 45
Although it is firmly committed to the free market system,
Peru is sensitive to the fact that new sources of renewable energy
are underdeveloped. The government, under the Law of Electrical
Concessions, is charged with the continuing duty to promote the
conservation of the environment and the "rational use of natural
resources in the undertaking of activities related to the generation,
transmission and distribution of electric energy. 2 46  This
legislatively mandated policy of promoting the environment and
natural resources has been viewed by the Ministry of Energy and
Mines as a policy that is easily harmonized with the economic
policy of depending on economic signals from the market to
determine when to build in the electricity sector.
Since direct government support of the renewables is contrary
to Peruvian public policy, the country is attempting to avoid
employing some of the more direct incentives, such as a mandated
energy mix, direct subsidies, or artificial renewable energy pricing.
Thus, when Peru drafted a geothermal resources law,247 the
development of environmentally benign geothermal resources was
promoted by fiscal incentives that were not extended to established
resources. These incentives were defended within the government
on the basis that the geothermal industry is a "pioneer industry."
This favored status encourages the renewable industry to come to
Peru and permits a young industry to compete with an established
one on a more level playing field.
245 See generally Peru, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 13, at 188-90 (discussing
the Peruvian electricty system and Peru's commitment to competition).
246 Decree Law No. 25844, Law of Electrical Concessions, art. 9 (1993) (Peru).
247 A geothermal resources law is pending before the Peruvian Congress.
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The incentive package set forth in Peru's proposed geothermal
resources law has six parts: (1) treatment of geothermal resources
as sui generis, (2) one stop shopping, (3) predictability, (4) use or
lose, (5) pioneer industry, and (6) minimal government
interference.
The first part of the incentive package defines geothermal
resources as unique and allows the creation of a separate legal
regime for geothermal development. In this way, geothermal
resources are separated from other resources and allowed to avoid
the complexities of integrating geothermal development laws into
an already established legal regime, such as the one that exists for
hydropower.
Second, the issuance of all licenses, concessions, and permits
for everything from initial exploration to production of electricity
for the grid are the sole responsibility of the MEM. The third part
of the incentive package is the three-tiered system of resource
license, resource concession, and electricity concession. This
incentive package is crafted to assure a developer from the outset
of exploration that if the developer invests in resource
development and fulfills the obligations it undertakes in a timely
manner, then the developer will be guaranteed to receive the
requisite permits, licenses, and concessions that will allow the
developer to produce and sell electricity to the grid.
The fourth incentive in the package is the "use or lose" policy
that prohibits a developer from sitting on a resource without
developing it. This policy is important because, in Peru, a
qualified party is allowed to file a claim on a resource area on a
first-come first-serve basis. Claim jumping is dealt with by
allowing a party with a preexisting claim of a different legal
nature, for instance mining, sixty days to substitute itself for a
claimant submitting a resource claim. The "use or lose" policy
means that a development license is valid for only five years and
that a holder of a development license has five years to develop a
commercial resource or it reverts to the government.
The fifth part of the incentive package sets forth incentives that
treat the geothermal industry as a pioneer industry. These
incentives are necessary to allow the industry to compete with
established competitors on a level playing field. As a pioneer
industry, the geothermal industry receives five advantages: (1) the
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income tax advantage, (2) customs and duties incentives, (3)
accounting incentives, (4) convertibility incentives, and (5)
revenue incentive. First, geothermal rights bearers may elect to
grandfather the tax regime in existence at the time a license or
concession is granted by entering into a judicial stability contract.
In that way, taxes will only be levied on income generated in Peru.
In other words, no long-arm taxation is allowed. In addition, if the
company incurs any losses, then they can be carried over and used
to offset any other Peruvian investments. Moreover, exploration
and financing costs are cumulative and may be carried over and
amortized by an accounting process elected by the concessionaire
upon its issuance. Second, all goods and supplies imported for
exploration purposes are exempt of all duties. Further, all goods
and supplies imported for the first five years of the exploitation of
geothermal resources and the production of electricity from
geothermal resources are also exempt. Third, a foreign company
is benefited by a flexible accounting system that allows it to
maintain its balance sheets in a foreign currency. Fourth, the
Central Reserve Bank of Peru will guarantee the availability of
foreign currency, which allows for easy convertibility. Finally,
Peru does not charge private developers for the state-owned
resources they develop. State revenue will come through income
taxes, not through royalty payments. The law does, however, levy
a small validity fee per hectare of an exploration area to remove
any incentive for speculators to claim large tracts without any
serious developmental intentions. In addition, it levies a royalty of
not greater than one percent of the average price of energy at its
generation level to fund the regulatory oversight functions.
The sixth part of the incentive package set forth in the
Geothermal Resources Law is minimal government interference.
At every point in the law and regulations, ministerial and
regulatory discretion is circumscribed. The criteria for decisions is
sharply drawn, and if the government does not act within the
proscribed time, usually about a week, then private-sector petitions
are automatically approved. In short, the regulatory structure is
geared toward industry self-regulation.
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C. Bolivian and Argentinean Versions of the Littlechild Model
Versions of the Littlechild or Southern Cone model were also
enacted in Bolivia and Argentina. 4 ' A review of the
implementation of these versions will illustrate the ways in which
the model may vary from country to country.
In Bolivia, the Law of Electricity separates the electricity
supply into generation, transmission, and distribution companies. 9
In isolated systems the electricity supply may be vertically
integrated. ° As the capitalization plan begins, the generators will
be required to sell to the distribution companies; eventually,
however, they will be allowed to sell directly to industrial
customers.' Until a power pool is established in Bolivia, power
sales will be determined based on contracts.252 The Bolivian power
pool is known as the National Load Dispatch Committee
(NLDC).253 The NLDC represents the generation, transmission,
and distribution companies, the non-regulated consumer, and the
254government.
In Bolivia, as in Peru, the distribution companies are required
to maintain current contracts with generation companies.255 The
law requires distributors to sign with generators "in order to fulfill
the electricity demand within its Concession area according to
rates agreed between the parties within the framework of this
[Electricity Law]." '256 The Bolivian law also mandates that these
contracts cover, at a minimum, eighty percent of the maximum
demand in the area for which a distribution company is
responsible, for at least three years. The NLDC is responsible for
calculating the node prices from the busbar in forty-eight month
248 See Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at 24; HELOU & PARDINA,
supra note 15, § 1.
249 See Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at 26.
250 See Ley No. 1604, Law of Electricity, 34 Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia 1862, art. 20
(Dec. 21, 1994) (Bol.).
251 See Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at 26.
252 See id.
253 See Ley No. 1604, Law of Electricty, art. 18 (Bol.).
254 See id.
255 See id. art. 30.1 (c).
256 See id. art. 3 1.
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projections, calculating the Basic Energy Price 27, and the Basic
Peak Power Price.258
One of the significant differences between the Peruvian and
Bolivian laws is that the transfer prices of power between
generators and distributors are regulated only if they are not
addressed in supply contracts. 2 9  Thus, the pricing in power
purchase agreements is unregulated. Nevertheless, the maximum
prices for the supplies to distribution companies at the delivery
nodes are subject to regulation by the Ministry of Energy &
Hydrocarbons.2 6' The effect appears to be a regulatory cap on
electricity prices, if not capacity. Finally, with respect to the rate
structure, tariffs that are paid to generators are to be linked to
short-term, marginal costs in determining a maximum price.261
The electricity law enacted in Argentina 262 is similar to the
laws--based on the Littlechild or Southern Cone model 26 -that
were adopted in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.26' There is, however, at
least one notable difference-the Argentine law uses marginal cost
to fix electricity prices.265
257 See id. art. 49(d). The balanced average of the marginal costs calculated before
the projected demand value. See id.
258 See id. art. 49(e). The "Annual Amount" of investment and the "Annual
Amount" for fixed operation, maintenance and administration cost, corresponding to the
most economical generation unit, to supply additional power during the annual hours of
maximum demand for the system. See id.
259 See id. art. 45.1(a).
260 See id. arts. 45.1(c), 47; see also Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at
26 (discussing the regulation of the Bolivian electricity industry).
261 See Bolivia, Second Quarter 1995, supra note 14, at 26 (discussing the rate
structure).
262 See Law No. 24065 (Dec. 19, 1991) (Arg.).
263 See Burr, Success, supra note 19, at 22 ("The power market is well developed in
Argentina, following a structure similar to the U.K. power pool system.").
264 For a discussion of the unbundled electric utility scheme in Bolivia, see supra
notes 248-61 and accompanying text. For a brief review of the unbundled electric utility
scheme in Chile, see supra note 12. For a discussion of the unbundled electric utility
scheme in Peru, see supra notes 172-247 and accompanying text.
265 See HELOU & PARDINA, supra note 15, at §§ 1-2 (discussing the privatization of
the Argentine electricity industry).
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IV. The Effect of Electricity Sector Reform on Renewable
Energy Development
A. Background
Over the past several decades, the primary international market
for the U.S. renewable energy industry consisted of foreign
governments and government-owned utilities.266  Under the
Littlechild model, government ownership and control of the
electric utilities is turned over to companies in the private sector."'
Thus, in order to find success in the nations that have adopted the
Littlechild model, the renewable energy industry will either need
to develop a market from among the new private-sector energy
companies or develop industry-owned merchant plants, developed
on a speculative basis and selling to the grid. The threat to the
renewable energy industry from the institutionalization of the
Littlechild model does not lie in the "unbundling" concept, the
concept of breaking up utility monopolies into arms-length
generation, transmission, and distribution companies.268 Rather,
the threat to renewable energy lies in the Littlechild model's
emphasis on short-term market prices to the exclusion of long-
term planning. 69 In other words, a utility enterprise conducting
business under the Littlechild model's market structure will not
have an "obligation to supply," in the utility sense of being
required to plan to acquire adequate generating capacity to meet
future demand. Under the Littlechild model's market structure,
each distribution company is only obligated to connect all
customers in its region and to sell them energy at a price that
reflects current costs plus a small, regulated premium. Moreover,
a generation company is not obligated to build plants, and a
distribution company is not obligated to enter into long-term
contracts on behalf of its customers. Consequently, under the
266 See generally FLAVIN & LENSSEN, supra note 100, at 240-66 (discussing the
reshaping of the electric power industry).
267 See Moore & DePinto, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the transformation of the
energy sector).
268 For a discussion of the unbundling of electric utilities in the United Kingdom,
see supra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
269 See Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 23.
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Littlechild model, new capacity will only be built when an
electrical energy enterprise decides, based upon market analysis,
that new capacity will provide a favorable return on investment
relative to projected pool prices.
In the United States, long-term power purchase agreements
serve as the foundation for independent renewable energy power
project financing. The Latin American legislation, on the other
hand, offers little incentive for a private distributor to enter a
contract for long-term generation capacity. In fact, under the
Littlechild model, it is difficult to imagine many compelling
reasons for distributors to enter into long-term power purchase
agreements with prospective renewable power generation
developers.27 Thus, in those Latin American nations that have
adopted a form of the Littlechild model, renewable energy
developers will lack a traditional government customer and will
likely find it difficult to negotiate and enter long-term power
purchase agreements, which heretofore have been prerequisite for
renewable energy development by independent power producers.
Moreover, the laws enacted in Latin America which are similar
to the Littlechild model do not provide special consideration for
the development of renewable energy resources. Interestingly,
after the Littlechild model was implemented in the United
Kingdom, this factor was deemed a deficiency in the model.27" '
Consequently, the United Kingdom established a 1500-megawatt
set-aside for renewable resources, with a special funding
consideration earmarked for the development of the more capital-
intense renewable technologies.272 Such a renewable energy set-
270 By analogy to the mortgage industry, an argument may be constructed that
customers may be convinced that it is preferable to enter into a long-term, predictable
agreement (a 30-year mortgage), than into a short-term, unpredictable agreement (a
variable-rate mortgage), in spite of the short-term economic advantages of such a short-
term agreement. In other words, the best Littlechild-country customer for the renewable
energy industry may be the customer that wants to lock in its cost for electricity.
271 See Woolf, supra note 11, at 60 (noting that the British government was forced
to intervene in order to support renewable resources).
272 See Renewables, POWER IN EUROPE, Aug. 13, 1993, at 22 (discussing the support
of renewable energy by the United Kingdom). The United Kingdom levies a
supplemental tax on electricity bills in order to fund renewable energy. See id. By the
year 2000, the goal is to have 1500 megawatts of renewable energy. See id.
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aside has not been adopted by any of the Latin American countries
that have adopted systems similar to the Littlechild model.
That is not to suggest that these Latin American countries are
not interested in renewable energy development.2 73 For instance,
some Latin American countries have long indicated a strong
interest in developing geothermal energy. 74 Nevertheless, some of
these same nations adopted an electricity-system model originally
designed for countries that have no geothermal resources.
Consequently, these Latin American countries have no precise
precedent upon which they may draw to develop geothermal
energy under the new electricity regimes."'
In fact, the geothermal developer, operating under the new
electricity regimes in place in Latin America, may be limited to
building merchant plants. In general, a merchant plant is built on
speculation; in other words, the plant is investor-financed, has no
long-term contract, and must compete to sell its electricity in the
open market once it is on-line. In the more developed markets,
merchant plants are built by companies that develop assets,
establish an income stream, and then sell the income stream to
276institutional customers. In essence, a merchant plant venture
capitalist is interested in turning around capital, not in ownership
of assets. 7 Any geothermal developer seeking to compete on the
merchant plant level will be in competition with the conventional
fuels and with the established power generation companies. If
merchant plants emerge as the dominant generation facilities in the
countries that have enacted the Littlechild or Southern Cone
model, then geothermal developers will be forced to compete with
273 See, e.g., Chronological Summary, supra note 22, at 369 (noting that, on
December 13, 1994, Chile and the United States "agreed to cooperate in developing
renewable energy projects to supply electricity to Chile's rural population").
274 See, e.g., ABEL H. PESCE, SECRETERIA DE MINERIA, ENERGIA GEOTERMICA:
PROMISORIA ALTERNATIVA 11-28 (1994) (reviewing the history of geothermal energy
and discussing the potential benefits of geothermal energy in Argentina).
275 See generally CHILE FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 12, 16
(noting that Chile, a nation that adopted an electricity system similar to the Littlechild
model's system, has geothermal energy sources that have not been developed).
276 See Churchill, supra note 75, at 22, 24.
277 See id. at 24 (noting that the institutional investors "will want to turn around
their capital as fast as possible and reinvest it in the development business").
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the well-financed, conventional fuel giants for debt and equity
monies. Since geothermal energy has not been commercialized in
most of Latin America, lending institutions will predictably view
the Latin American markets as a high risk. This risk factor,
coupled with the absence of long-term contracts that have
traditionally supported low equity investment, will make it
difficult for project financing to avoid the higher equity investment
requirements prevailing in the conventional-fuel arena."' Similar
analyses apply to the other renewable energies.
One of the goals of the countries implementing the Littlechild
and Southern Cone models was to seek new sources of capital for
new generation capacity. Paradoxically, the system they enacted
results in a pro-demand-side competitive market that is at odds
with their self-proclaimed, pro-supply-side goal of raising private-
sector capital to build new facilities.
In all fairness, it should be noted that, in adopting the
Littlechild or Southern Cone model, governments seemed
convinced that the new electric power generation structure would
deliver electricity to the maximum number of consumers at the
lowest possible price. Currently, there is no way to know whether
that conviction will be borne out in practice, "and the political
acceptability of any power model will ultimately depend upon the
actual price paid by the consumer."279  These governments are
convinced, almost as a matter of faith, that a competitive
marketplace will encourage new capital investment. The leaders
of these nations are unreceptive to the possibility that the
Littlechild and Southern Cone models' emphasis on short-term
market prices may have a chilling effect on the financial markets'
underwriting of private-sector investment. The leaders of these
nations seem unreceptive because, in large measure, the
governments have little or no experience with private-sector
project financing.28
278 See id. at 22 (concluding that project financing is only moderately useful and
that the development of local capital markets is a long-term solution).
279 See Ganguli, supra note 35, at 22 (discussing the opportunities for independent
power companies in India).
280 Ironically, Britain's massive effort to privatize utilities is becoming a model for
the world just as the model is starting to show flaws. In Britain, the incentive-based rate
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The countries of ,Latin America must make a strategic
assessment and determine the actions that they will need to take in
order to secure indigenous, base-load energy resources. The short-
term pricing mechanisms of the new electricity regimes create
dynamics that favor established generation companies whose cash
flow allows debt secured by a proven income stream and whose
established facilities can be upgraded at lower costs than
development of a "greenfield" site, a site developed from scratch.
The playing field is not level for a new entrant who would be
burdened with start-up costs that are not borne by the members of
the generation establishment. Those Latin American countries that
have the major renewable resource development potential have, as
a national strategy, opted for private development. These same
countries must now strategically consider whether to offer
sufficient incentives to promote greenfield sites and to assist the
greenfield industry in competing directly with the established
generation companies within the Littlechild or Southern Cone
framework."s'
B. Industry Growth Through Project Financing
The renewable energy development community has, over the
past several decades, evolved along two market tracks:
domestically, the industry has grown through independent power
producers, funded by project financing; overseas, the industry has
grown primarily as a result of turn-key sales to governments and
government-owned utilities. Industry sales were funded in the
earlier years by international or regional bank government loans,
and in more recent years by loans arranged through such
institutions as the Export-Import Bank of the United States
(EXIMBank), 82 the Overseas Project Investment Corporation
scheme has resulted in rising household bills and large profits for the regional electricity
companies-i.e., the distribution sector. See Pope, supra note 9, at A10. See also supra
text accompanying note 35.
281 See generally Burr, Success, supra note 19, at 22 ("Significant greenfield
development will require a realization at the government or industrial level that new
development has long-term planning and economic advantages.").
282 See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, PRESS RELEASE I (May 1995)
[hereinafter EXIMBANK 1995 PRESS RELEASE] (announcing the signing of an agreement
between the EXIMBank and two U.S. corporations to commit $165 million to the
Mahanagdong Geothermal Power Station in the Philippines).
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(OPIC), and the Foreign Investment Corporation (FIC).
1. Exporting Project Financing
As public-sector markets have opened up to private-sector
investment, various members of the United States geothermal and
hydropower development communities have attempted to export
domestic project financing packages. This process required
educating both the lending institutions and the borrowing
customers. OPIC has been engaged in project financing of energy
projects since the 1980s. EXIMBank, however, only recently
developed a project financing approach to the energy sector; in
fact, it funded its first project in the energy sector in 1992.283
Convincing international lending institutions of the efficacy of
project financing within the context of renewable energy
development has been a Herculean task; however, educating the
customer to the intricacies and prerequisites of project financing
has proven to be even more difficult.284 Although many of the
potential government customers for the products of the industry
are very sophisticated in World Bank and public-sector financing,
they have proven to be unfamiliar with, and unreceptive to, the
mandates and intricacies of project financing.
There are two distinct forms of project financing within the
electricity generation business: (1) the creation of new generating
capacity for a utility customer, and (2) the creation of generating
capacity for the self-generation or direct-use customers such as
mining and manufacturing corporations--the "inside-the-fence"
generation units. In both cases, power purchase agreements have
historically been prerequisites to project financing. Moreover, in
the case of a government-owned utility customer, lending
institutions often require government guarantees. In the case of
private-sector utilities or private end-user customers, the financial
viability of the customer is essential to the approval of a project
283 See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, PRESS RELEASE 1 (May 31,
1994) [hereinafter EXIMBANK 1994 PRESS RELEASE] (discussing the EXIMBank's 1992
agreement with Peru that enabled OPIC to extend its services to Peru); see also
EXIMBANK 1995 PRESS RELEASE, supra note 282, at 1.
284 See generally Churchill, supra note 75, at 22-25 (discussing the intricacies of
project financing).
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financing loan or guarantee.285
One final issue completes the description of the evolution of
project financing on the international scene. Competitive bidding
is becoming an integral part of independent power production.
Domestically, the majority of the renewable energy community in
the United States does not compete in all-source bidding.
Internationally, when a government is determined to exploit its
resources such as geothermal or hydropower, RFPs are issued in
which only the developers of a designated resource are
competing--such bids are government-issued after the process of
long range planning has been completed at the government level.
As an open market economy becomes more and more prevalent
and long-range government planning takes on a diminished role,
competition will increase among competing energy sources and
decrease among developers within a pre-approved, single energy
sector.
2. Exporting Equity and Bond Financing
Other sectors of the energy industry, outside of the renewable
resources sector, have approached project financing in a way that
may change overseas project financing forever.286 Independent
power producers have consistently attempted to minimize the
amount of their equity in a power project; during the past decade,
however, equity participation has become essential.287 The large,
well-financed companies in the hydrocarbon area are better
positioned than the companies in the renewable sector to put up
substantial equity resources. Investment by the hydrocarbon
companies is up from the historical debt to equity ratio of seventy
to thirty in developing countries to as high as fifty to fifty.2 ' This
higher debt to equity ratio has become a standard for lending to
285 See generally Siddique, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing the importance of
financial viability when considering developing a private power generator).
286 See generally Churchill, supra note 75, at 22-23, 27-29 (discussing the ways in
which project financing is changing); Joseph G. Sauvage, Private Power Evolution
Presents Challenges and Opportunities, PRIVATE POWER EXECUTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at
35, 36 (discussing trends in corporate financing, in public capital market financing, and
in equity financing of power projects).
287 See Sauvage, supra note 286, at 36.
288 See Churchill, supra note 75, at 23, 28-29.
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overseas power projects. Furthermore, the hydrocarbon industry
has made great inroads into the developing countries that have a
viable investment market, proving that equity can be raised
through the issuance of bonds and other investment instruments.289
C. Emergence of the Merchant Plant Under the Littlechild
Model
From the perspective of the renewable energy industry, the
major concern lies in the Littlechild and Southern Cone models'
promotion of short-term market prices to the exclusion of long-
term planning.
290
The Littlechild and the Southern Cone model both purport to
foster open competition in the electricity sector, but ingrain short-
term pricing into implementing legislation. Mandated short-term
pricing distorts market forces by giving great weight to short-term
considerations to the detriment of long-term considerations. The
model is geared towards encouraging distributors to buy the least
expensive electricity on the current market and measures the
distributors' profit accordingly. In the short-term, this approach
tends to favor existing generators.
The model does not provide adequate encouragement of the
introduction of new capacity over the longer term, for it
discourages the long-term pricing structures required by those
financial markets underwriting private-sector capital investment in
new generation. Until new capacity requirements outstrip the
ability to re-power existing generators, a hiatus in new capacity of
the more capital-intensive technologies seems likely. After this
hiatus, it seems that the legislated isolation of generation from
transmission and distribution, coupled with short-term pricing
structures, will result in narrowing the universe of new generation
vehicles to only one--the merchant plant. The merchant plant is
built on speculation, meaning that it is investor-financed, has no
long-term contract, and, once on-line, competes to sell its
electricity on the open market.
In essence, the Littlechild model limits the purchase price of
289 See id. at 25-26.
290 See generally Renewables, POWER IN EUROPE, Nov. 18, 1994, at 23, 24 (noting
that "it would be cheaper not to generate from renewables at all").
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capacity and electricity that are destined for the general customer
to busbar tariffs. These busbar rates are calculated for electricity
as average-expected, short-run marginal cost and are calculated for
capacity as the annualized investment and fixed operating costs of
the type of generation which would provide peak capacity at least
cost. Thus, the prospective renewable resources developer must
buy into a system in which prices for electricity are never fixed
and prices for capacity are based on a hypothetical least-cost
calculation. In both cases these prices are calculated by an
electricity pool, the members of which represent the status quo
establishment. Furthermore, there are few incentives for a
distributor to enter into long-term contracts with generators; with
the potential exception of a distributor's locking in a low price for
a long term. Although countries in which the Littlechild model is
in place still offer fixed-price, long-term opportunities, either
through direct sales to industry, like inside-the-fence contracts, or
through investment in grid-isolated areas, renewable energy
development, as a main-stream energy source, will undoubtedly
incur roadblocks.9
V. Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations
Both the Littlechild model and the Southern Core model are
elegant in structure; and, given the current belief that unleashing
market forces to work without the involvement of government is
292best for the consumer, the industry, and the world's economy,
the unbundled model is powerfully compelling. Thus, regardless
of the merits of the model, the renewable energy industry will
have to work within the new framework. How the industry adapts
to meet this new challenge will determine whether this new world
order for the electrical generation business represents an
impenetrable barrier or a small bump in the road.293
Since the inception of the renewable energy industry in the
291 See Tim Hennagir, From Midland to Magellan, IND. ENERGY, Oct. 1994, at 30
(noting that when "the price of power is set by a competitive pool.., this would make
new project development difficult").
292 See Cavanagh, Future, supra note 18, at 23.
293 See Salpukas, supra note 19, at D9 (discussing the floundering of renewable
energies in the "bottom line 90s").
1997] 505
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
United States, the industry's primary export partners have been the
foreign governments or government-owned utilities. 4  The
industry has always had in its hip pocket two alternative
approaches: (1) project financing based on the revenues from long-
term, power purchase agreements with low equity-to-debt ratios,295
and (2) the BOT, BOOT, and BTO models.9 6
With the advent of the Littlechild and Southern Cone models,
the ground rules changed in three fundamental ways. First,
privatization and capitalization effectively removed the
government as the client. 97 Second, short-term contracting and
short-term pricing began to dominate the marketplace. 98
Moreover, international financial institutions, perceiving increased
risk due to the short-term nature of energy contracts under the new
electricity regimes, are likely to ratchet-up their debt-to-equity
ratio requirements to as high as fifty percent equity and are likely
to loan only short-term funds.'" The legislative encouragement of
short-term contracting along with concomitant disincentives to
long-term financing and low equity requirements bring into
question whether traditional project financing models are able to
support new development in the electricity industry. Third, the
new and pending national electricity laws based on the Littlechild
and Southern Cone models effectively discourage the development
of any new generation source requiring large capital investments
and entailing high risk.
As the new market system takes hold and government
monopolies disappear, the industry may face a long period of
inactivity unless one of the following three things occurs: (1) the
evolving legal regimes recognize the intrinsic value of
encouraging the development of renewable energy, (2) new and
creative ways of financing are developed, or (3) new technologies
significantly reduce the up-front cost of renewable technology
294 See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 137, 281 and accompanying text.
299 See Churchill, supra note 75, at 23; see also discussion supra notes 286-89 and
accompanying text.
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development. For the most part, industry investments in countries
enacting the new legal regimes will be from independent power
producers, who rely on project financing.3" Project financing of
new generating capacity is dependent upon long-term assurances
that a generation facility will be able to sell its power at a
calculable, if not predictable, price.3 In contrast, a market system
primarily or exclusively focused on the current price of electricity
will not foster the long-term conditions requisite to financing the
construction of new renewable resource generation projects under
traditional project-financing models."2 If the industry does not act
quickly to transform its financing structure, it may soon find itself
to be an outsider in the base-load, core electricity industry.
The three fundamental changes in the electricity industry under
the Littlechild model will require the renewable energy industry to
develop a new entry strategy. It seems that there are at least seven
viable options that the renewable energy industry should consider
in its effort to develop a new entry strategy.
First, the renewable energy industry should consider rethinking
the structuring of industry financing in the nations that have
adopted the new model.3"3 In reconsidering the structuring, new
alliances must be forged, old financial mechanisms must be recast,
and new financial devices must be created. If the renewable
energy industry is determined to compete as a serious developer of
merchant plants, the renewable energy companies currently
competing as vendors domestically and internationally will need to
rethink the viability of a coordinated, consolidated international
strategy. The building of merchant plants cries out for pooling of
equity resources and sharing of risks 3o--the classic situation for
the formation of export trading companies. As an alternative to
independent merchant plants, renewable energy companies may
decide to buy into existing generation facilities in order to leverage
existing income streams in a country for the purpose of raising
300 See generally id. at 23-25 (discussing project finance).
301 See id. See generally Peppiatt, supra note 117, at 46 (discussing the project
financing of power stations).
302 See Churchill, supra note 75, at 24.
303 See id. at 28.
304 See id. at 27.
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sufficient debt and equity to add capacity. If the foregoing
approaches prove strategically impossible, the renewable energy
industry may decide to focus its market efforts on inside-the-fence
development, thereby dedicating itself to sales to large mining and
industrial complexes in the market countries.
A second option for the renewable energy industry is to
convince governments that renewable energy development is in
their self-interest. 5 This approach would entail persuading
government officials and legislators that developing a country's
renewable technologies will make a significant contribution to
economic independence by utilizing indigenous resources, by
avoiding the cyclical supply and cost disruptions due to
international economics or political events, by conserving hard
currency, and by improving environmental and health quality.
One viable option is a renewable set-aside as added to the United
Kingdom's electricity system.3"6 The renewable energy industry
should establish a program focused on educating the decision
makers in the key market countries about the positive externalities
that renewable energy adds to the energy mix.3 7
Third, the renewable energy industry should undertake a
detailed analysis of the capacity payments in each of the market
countries. Energy and capacity payments vary within different
formulations of the Littlechild or Southern Cone model enacted in
Latin America. These capacity payment formulations need both
an exacting and a detailed economic analysis in each country.
Fourth, the renewable energy industry should articulate and
promote the value of renewable resource development at the
inception of the legislative and regulatory process that alters a
nation's electric power sector."' Policy makers are most receptive
at the outset of the policy making process, but it is virtually
305 See FLAVIN & LENSSEN, supra note 100, at 299 (noting that governments will
need to focus "on ways to ensure that environmental costs are considered when
economic decisions are made").
306 See id. at 262-63 (discussing set-asides as a mechanism to address
environmental problems).
307 See id. at 307.
308 See generally id. at 307-08 (discussing the importance of encouraging the use of
renewable energy as nations develop their infrastructure).
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impossible to reinvent the wheel. The renewable energy industry
should be positioned to assist developing countries in establishing
their legal regimes for renewable energy.
The fifth option that the renewable energy industry should
consider is the expansion of the base of support for development.
By increasing in each country the number of players that have a
stake in renewable energy development, the industry may better
position itself to achieve concrete results.
Sixth, the renewable energy industry should invest in
privatized utilities. Although the renewable energy industry does
not have significant experience in utility management, the industry
can conceivably form coalitions, combining its expertise with the
expertise of other industry corporations to bid collectively on
generation facilities that are being privatized or capitalized.
Moreover, the industry can invest in established sites in countries,
like Mexico, where the refurbishment of existing facilities is a
legislative priority. Seventh, the renewable energy sector should
continue to develop new technology.0 9  Advancements in
renewable energy technology are a condition precedent to the
industry becoming competitive."' In whatever way one evaluates
the importance of emerging technology, like the hot dry rock
technology being studied by the geothermal industry,31' the
immediate success of the renewable energy industry will be
determined by whether the bread and butter of the industry can be
brought into economic alignment with the more competitive fuel
resources.
312
Defining the problem is half the battle.313 The renewable
energy industry's strategic planners must begin to forge the
solution. In short, the renewable energy industry must mobilize its
forces to ensure that the countries promoting private-sector
development of renewable resources have the mechanisms in place
to allow the realization of their goals. The greatest challenge for
309 See FLAVIN & LENSSEN, supra note 100, at 302-04.
310 See id.
311 See Renewables, POWER IN EUROPE, Sept. 23, 1994, at 24.
312 See id. at 304.
313 See generally Burr, Survival, supra note 56, at 10 (discussing some of the
problems that arise in nations that adopt versions of the Littlechild model).
1997] 509
510 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 22
the renewable energy industry is to convince each developing
country that it is in their own self-interest to implement policies
that establish and promote a viable renewable-energy industry in
their country.
